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My dissertation explores the effect of ethnic conflict, or regulations meant to avoid
ethnic strife, on firm employment and productivity in developing countries. The
first chapter investigates the impact of the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire that began in
2000, using a census of all registered firms for the years 1998-2003. We use structural
estimates of the production function and exploit spatial variations in conflict intensity
to derive the cost of conflict on firms in terms of productivity loss. The results indicate
that the conflict led to an average 16-23% drop in firm total factor productivity
and the decline is 5-10 percentage point larger for foreign firms. These results are
consistent with anecdotal evidence of attacks on and looting of foreigners and their
businesses during the conflict. We also find evidence to support the hypothesis that
firms responded by hiring less foreign workers.
The second chapter studies affirmative action policies in Malaysia, focusing on a
specific policy in the private sector. In particular, I examine the impact of a regu-
latory change which no longer requires foreign-owned manufacturers above a certain
size to reserve 30% equity for (ethnic) Malay shareholders. I set up a theoretical
model to show that the original policy results in a range of firms to stay inefficiently
small. Removing this equity requirement for foreign firms leads to two effects: (i)
foreign firms become less likely to be sized constrained, and (ii) their average size
increases relatively to other firms. These predictions are supported by empirical ev-
idence from difference-in-difference estimations, based on firm-level data from the
Malaysia Productivity and Investment Climate Survey in 2002 and 2007.
Finally, chapter three examines the relationship between labor standards and mar-
ket power in imports in a cross-country context. The hypothesis is that since labor
standard policies can act as a substitute for import tariffs, all else equal, bigger
importers would have lower labor standards. IV estimation with geography-based
instruments finds evidence consistent with theory. In general, countries with higher
market shares in labor intensive imports tend to have weaker Free Association and
Collective Bargaining rights. Moreover, the effect is stronger among GATT members.
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My dissertation consists of three empirical chapters on the private sector in devel-
oping countries. I am particularly interested in the implications of ethnic diversity
and ethnicity-based conflict on economic activities. My first two chapters share this
common theme. The first chapter, based on coauthored work with Leora Klapper
and Christine Richmond, studies the impact of an ethnic conflict on firm produc-
tivity and employment in Cote d’Ivoire. The second chapter explores the impact
of an affirmative action policy on employment of manufacturing firms in Malaysia,
another country with stark economic divides along ethnic lines. Together, these two
chapters touch on different aspects of the economic consequences from the political
deliberation process to affect resource distribution among ethnic groups. In a sense,
both the state-sponsored violence and affirmative action policies studied in the first
two chapters can be thought of as a means to alter the “terms of trade” between
different ethnic and nationality groups within a country for political gains. In the
third chapter, I study whether labor standards policies are used to manipulate the
(“classical”) terms of trade in a broader cross-country setting.
My work in this dissertation belongs to the economic literature on the private
sector in developing countries. Until recently, this literature has remained relatively
limited due the lack of firm-level data. Understanding what affects the growth in size
and productivity of firms in the private sector is however one of the key questions
in development. The private sector, especially the manufacturing sector, has long
been considered a crucial element of modern economic growth and a source of various
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positive spillovers (Kuznets 1973, Tybout 2000). A vibrant private sector is also
instrumental to job creation. According to the World Development Report (World
Bank 2013), youth employment in developing countries is widespread and growing.
Moreover, the majority of those who are employed work in very small, low wage and
low skilled firms and farms. The problem of how to expand employment, especially
skilled non-agricultural work, through the expansion of firms is therefore a pressing
global concern (Blattman at. el 2013). This dissertation seeks to contribute to this
body of literature by studying the interactions between various distortions - caused
by either violent conflict or government policies - and economic outcomes both at the
firm and cross-country level.
Chapter 1 highlights the asymmetric cost that an ethnic conflict has on different
types of firms. We consider the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire which began in 2000 and even-
tually culminated into a Civil War in 2002. During the conflict, anti-northerners and
anti-foreigners sentiments are tolerated and even encouraged by politicians, leading to
disproportional increases in violent attacks on and looting of immigrants/foreigners
and their businesses. As a result, our analysis focuses on the differential impact of the
conflict on foreign and domestic firms. We employ on a unique data set constructed
from the census of all registered firms for the years 1998-2003. We use structural
estimates of the production function to derive firm-level TFP estimates and exploit
spatial variations in conflict intensity to derive the cost of conflict on firms in terms
of productivity loss. The results indicate that the conflict led to an average 16-23%
drop in firm TFP. Importantly, the decline is 5-10 percentage point larger for firms
that are owned by or employing foreigners. Furthermore, we find evidence suggesting
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that firms responded by hiring less foreign workers.
While the first chapter looks the impact of ethnic conflict on firms, the second chap-
ter examines the impact of a policy meant to avoid ethnic strife. More specifically,
I consider the set of affirmative action policies under the New Economic Policy in
Malaysia. These policies were first implemented in 1971 to correct for the long stand-
ing ethnic inequality between native Malays and the Chinese minority, and cover a
wide range of pro-Malay measures in education, public sector employment and busi-
nesses. I focus on one aspect of the policies in the private sector. In particular, I
examine the impact of a regulatory change in 2003 which no longer requires foreign-
owned manufacturers above a certain size threshold to set aside 30% of their equity
for Malays shareholders. I set up a simple theoretical model to show that the original
policy results in a distortion that renders a range of firms to stay smaller than their
optimal employment size. Removing this equity requirement for foreign firms leads to
two effects: (i) foreign firms become less likely to be sized constrained, and (ii) their
average size increases relatively to other firms. My empirical analysis is based on
two rounds of the Malaysia Productivity and Investment Climate Survey in 2002 and
2007. Results from difference-in-differences estimations find evidence consistent with
these the predictions. I find that employment in foreign firms increases significantly
by 18-19% and those that are below the size threshold in the first period are also 20%
less likely to report as being smaller than optimal.
In the last chapter, I turn to cross-country data to find evidence for whether do-
mestic policies are used to alter the terms of trade between countries. The motivation
comes from the terms of trade hypothesis which predicts that all else equal, countries
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with higher market power in imports would set higher tariffs due to positive welfare
gains from lower import prices. The trade literature has found empirical support for
this prediction in the context of non WTO countries. My research asks a related
questions, which is whether countries constrained in setting their tariffs would use
domestic policies, in particular - labor standards- as a substitute for trade policy. My
empirical analysis is based on instrumental variable estimation with geography-based
instruments to account for endogeneity of trade and income. I find that in general,
countries with higher market shares in labor intensive imports tend to have weaker
Free Association and Collective Bargaining rights. Moreover, the effect is stronger







First and foremost, I would like to thank Anna Alberini, my advisor and Disser-
tation Committee Chair, for her support and guidance throughout the completion of
this dissertation. Many thanks to Charles Towe, Ken Leonard, Pam Jakiela, Vivian
Hoffman and Maureen Cropper, for serving on my committee and providing very
useful comments. I am also thankful to other professors in the department, espe-
cially Barrett Kirwan and Carol McAusland, for teaching me and helping form my
understanding and thinking in economics.
I am very grateful to my collaborators, Christine Richmond and Leora Klapper,
for their encouragement, support and many helpful discussions.
Lastly, I thank all my friends and fellow graduate students who shared this grad
school experience with me. Kabir, Kanishka, Eduardo, Hien, Toan, and Ha, you made
many of my days here infinitely better.
vii
Contents
1. Civil Conflict and Firm Performance: Evidence from Cote d’Ivoire . . . . . 1
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1 Conceptual framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2 Productivity estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3 Heterogeneous impact of conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.4 Endogenous foreign employment choices . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.1 The firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2 Firm entry and exit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.3 Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.1 Productivity evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2 Heterogeneous effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.3 Channels of impact and robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6.4 Do firms adjust the shares of foreign workers? . . . . . . . . . 41
7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2. The impact of affirmative action and equity regulations on manufacturing firms
in Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2 Institutional background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.1 Affirmative action and policy instruments in manufacturing . 66
2.2 Regulatory changes in the sample period . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4 Model and hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5 Empirical tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.2 Model and estimation strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6 Results and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.1 Main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.2 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.3 Alternative explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
viii
7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3. Labor Standards, Market Power and the Terms of Trade Incentive: An Em-
pirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3 Estimation framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.1 Estimated equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.2 Instrumental Variables estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.1 Main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.2 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Appendix 131
1. Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A Empirical model with an endogenous productivity process . . . . . . 132
B Data appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
B.1 Construction of variables used in TFP estimation . . . . . . . 134
B.2 Constructing ownership variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
B.3 Conflict data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3. Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
A Data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
B Main variables by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
ix
List of Tables
1.1 Panel information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.2 Panel length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.3 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.4 Percentage of firms by ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.5 Transition rate in/out of foreign status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
1.6 Firm characteristics differentials between foreign owned and Ivorian firms 56
1.7 TFP and foreign ownership/employment over time - full sample . . . 57
1.8 Impact of conflict and foreign employment on TFP - full sample . . . 58
1.9 Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.10 Robustness checks in sub-samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.11 Trends in skill and nationality composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.12 Labor adjustments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1.13 Effect of foreign employment on productivity (endogenous foreign em-
ployment) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.14 Effect of foreign employment on productivity (endogenous foreign em-
ployment), by size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.1 Sample distribution by industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.2 Number of firms by age group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.3 Firm ownership by round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.4 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.5 Summary statistics for treated and control groups . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.6 Impact on firm size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.7 Reported size constraints in the panel sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.8 Size constraint probabilities (marginal effects reported) . . . . . . . . 94
2.9 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.10 Percentage of permanent workers of foreign nationals . . . . . . . . . 95
2.11 Alternative explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.1 The impact of import shares on FACB rights OLS results . . . . . . 126
3.2 IV results treating import and export shares as endogenous . . . . . . 127
3.3 IV results treating trade shares, income & GATT membership as en-
dogenous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.4 Sensitivity analysis 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.5 Sensitivity analysis 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
x
1.B.1Industries and industry groupings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
1.B.2Production function coefficient estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
1.B.3Correlation coefficients of productivity estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.B.1FACB rights, log of import shares and export shares . . . . . . . . . . 138
xi
List of Figures
1.1 Major political and conflict events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.2 Conflict intensity by department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.3 Firm distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.4 Rate of entering and exiting firms and aggregate net job creation . . . 48
1.5 Entry and exit rate by ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.6 Average size of entering and exiting firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.7 Average age of exiting firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.8 Trend in average value added over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.9 Distribution of capital and capital/labor ratio before-after 2000 . . . 51
1.10 Trend in un-weighted aggregate TFP index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.11 Yearly effects of foreign ownership/employment on TFP . . . . . . . . 52
2.1 Firm size distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
xii
Chapter 1. Civil Conflict and Firm Performance: Evidence
from Cote d’Ivoire
(with Leora Klapper and Christine Richmond)
1 Introduction
More than a quarter of the world’s population lives in countries affected by in-
stability and violent conflicts, many recurrent events (World Bank 2011). Previous
studies have shown the devastating consequences of war and conflict on various human
capital outcomes such as health and education, however, less is known about how the
private sector is affected and how firms adapt during such situations, primarily due
to a lack of data. Nonetheless, understanding these effects is important for at least
two reasons: (i) the private sector is identified as an important engine of growth for
developing countries; and (ii) reconstruction policies require the allocation of scarce
resources. By understanding the impact of conflict on the private sector, resources
can be appropriately allocated to improve the prospects for recovery.
This paper fills a gap in the literature by studying the impact of conflict on firms in
the context of Cote d’Ivoire. Cote d’Ivoire presents an interesting case study since it
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has a relatively large private sector,1 with systematic collection of information on reg-
istered firms since the 1970s. Economic fluctuations and power struggles characterize
the early 1990s, but prior to experiencing its first coup d’tat on Christmas Eve 1999,
most observers still considered serious political violence to be unlikely in a country
that had enjoyed an uninterrupted 30-year period of political stability. The 1999
coup marks the beginning for an episode of social unrest and eventually a Civil War
in 2002. At the center of Cote d’Ivoire’s crises were issues of ethnicity and nationality,
fueled by political tactics exploiting discontent between its southern populations and
the large migrant populations from neighboring countries.
Our analysis makes use of detailed financial and employment data from the census
of formal firms for the years 1998-2003. We document that starting in 2000, firms
enter at a decreasing rate and exit at an increasing rate. Aggregate employment
also decreases. Moreover, average output is 20-40% lower than in the pre-conflict
period. These patterns coincide with the surge of violence starting in 2000. However,
this period of violence in Cote d’Ivoire is also coupled with major macroeconomic
shocks, including large swings in commodity prices and a collapse of foreign aid.2 As
a result, even though these conflict events are largely unanticipated, it is not possible
to identify the common macro component of the conflict impact with the data at
hand.
The paper focuses on disentangling the non-macro component of the conflict im-
1 In Cote d’Ivoire, the formal private sector accounts for 60% of GDP (Berthelemy and Bour-
guignon 1996).
2 Cocoa prices - Cote d’Ivoire most important export - dropped substantially from 1998-2000
before rebounding in 2002 and 2003 (The Economist 2003). Much of the country’s foreign aid was
suspended in 2000 as the World Bank, IMF, and EU withdrew support to Cote d’Ivoire in response
to the 1999 coup (The Economist 2000).
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pact associated with certain firm characteristics. In particular, we test whether firms
owned by or employing foreigners were impacted disproportionally. We aim to iden-
tify (i) the magnitude and heterogeneity in the costs of conflict associated with firm
ownership and employment; (ii) potential transmission mechanisms of these hetero-
geneous effects; and (iii) how firms respond to conflict intensity. The focus on foreign
ownership/employment is motivated by anecdotal evidence which suggests increasing
anti-foreigner sentiments during this period led to disproportional attacks and looting
targeting foreigners and foreign businesses.
Given the absence of data on the direct costs and losses due to violence and conflict,
we propose a 2-step approach to infer the magnitude of these losses from the available
data. In the first step, we estimate production functions following Olley and Pakes
(1996) and Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) to correct for endogeneity of input
use and firm exit. We then use parameter estimates from the production functions to
recover a measure of firm total factor productivity (TFP). Since TFP is essentially a
residual that contains any information not captured by observed inputs, output losses
that firms incur due to violence and conflict will be reflected in this variable. In the
second step, we regress the estimated TFP on measures of foreign ownership, foreign
employment and conflict. To test whether foreign firms are impacted differently, we
interact foreign ownership/employment with conflict variables, exploiting the fact
that the coup in 1999 came as an unanticipated shock so the following civil unrest
is exogenous to individual firms. To proxy for conflict, we use both a period dummy
and an intensity variable which makes use of the geographical variations in conflict
pattern and detailed information on firm location.
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The results indicate that foreign owned firms and firms employing foreigners have
higher productivity on average but that this advantage over domestic firms was re-
duced by the conflict. Having at least one foreign employee is associated with an
extra 9.7% reduction in firm’s measure TFP - or a 9.7% decline in output holding
other inputs constant - during the conflict period. Foreign ownership does not ap-
pear have an effect until 2003, when it is associated with a 18.8% decline in TFP. In
the specifications that rely on conflict intensity, we find an increase of one standard
deviation in the conflict rate reduces TFP by 10-11% on average and each additional
percentage point increase in the share of foreign employees increases the conflict im-
pact on TFP by about one percentage point. In aggregate, the implied annual impact
of conflict on firm’s TFP from different specifications ranges from 16-23%. These ef-
fects are qualitatively similar when we used a modified Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer’s
procedure to control for simultaneity between productivity shocks and the choice of
foreign employment, along similar line of Van Biesebroeck (2005) and De Loecker
(2007). The results are also robust to alternative definitions of industry and different
specifications of the production functions to allow for changes in expected investment
returns and factor prices over time.
We investigate possible channels of impact, and find that industry concentration
and export orientation have no significant impact on TFP, suggesting the conflict had
no effect on firms’ ability to charge mark-ups. On the other hand, TFP decreases
significantly for for firms in import oriented industries, indicating rising cost of im-
ported inputs might be a channel of impact. Finally, we find evidence supporting a
simple model of labor adjustment in which firms reduce the shares of foreign workers
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at any given relative wage to compensate for their negative effect on productivity.
The contribution of our paper is three-fold. First, we utilize a unique dataset
which covers all formal private sector firms in the economy, both before and during
the conflict. Hence our analysis is representative of all formal firms and is longitu-
dinal, unlike most existing research on firms and conflict which is often limited by
cross section and/or survey data. Second, by measuring the impact on productivity,
our methodology enables us to overcome data restrictions to estimate the conflict’s
economic costs. Since all regressions control for firm and industry-specific time ef-
fects and other observable characteristics, our estimated impact is net of any common
macroeconomic trends or shocks and likely represents the lower bound impact of the
conflict. Finally, the question of an asymmetric impact on foreigners is important
since foreign investment plays a crucial role in Cote d’Ivoire3 and other developing
countries. Moreover, if firms are affected because of their identity, it implies the con-
flict creates an additional distortion to the reallocation of resources, further lowering
potential aggregate output.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes Cote
d’Ivoire’s institutional background in more detail and motivates our hypotheses. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the related literature on conflict and productivity. Section 4 presents
a brief conceptual framework and our empirical strategy. Section 5 describes the data
and preliminary analysis and section 6 presents the econometric results, including a
discussion on firm’s responses in terms of labor composition. Section 7 concludes.
3 For example, French investment constitutes 25% of total capital invested in Ivorian firms (World




Cote d’Ivoire’s first coup d’etat on Christmas Eve 1999 marked the beginning of
a violent episode and eventually a civil war that divided the country along north
and south lines (see figure 1.1 for a summary of events). Initially staged by middle-
rank military officers as a response to low wages in the military, the coup came as a
complete surprise. A report by the BBC (2000a) noted:
The people of this city had never experienced a coup d’etat before, ... hundreds
of local people were standing frozen on the pavements, staring at the soldiers
in complete disbelief.
Before this event, Cote d’Ivoire had been a much more stable country. Despite
having some 60 ethno-language groups and 25% of the population made up of immi-
grants, it managed to maintain economic growth and political stability for more than
30 years after independence. While a policy of “Ivoirite” - which sought to redefine
who constitutes “true” Ivorians - had increased social tension during the mid 1990s,
the economy was showing signs of improvements after a devaluation package in 1994.
The 1999 coup greatly increased political uncertainty (The Economist 2002). Robert
Guei, the coup’s leader, initially promised to step down after cleaning up the toxic
political environment created by his predecessor’s “Ivoirite” policy. Instead, he de-
cided to run for president only a few months later and further enforced the same policy
that requires both parents of any presidential candidate to be Ivorian citizens (Kohler
2003). This excluded Alassane Ouatarra, a candidate originally from the North, from
running. The general election in October 2000 threw the country into chaos. Lau-
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rent Gbagbo, the opposition candidate, won but disputed results set off widespread
violent clashes among Guei and Gbagbo’s supporters. Legislative elections held later
in December also saw unprecedented violence by pro-Gbagbo youth and militias at-
tacked northerners and immigrants for their supposed support for Ouatarra’s party
(McGovern 2011, Marshall-Fratani 2006).
Gbagbo ran on an anti-French and anti-foreigners political platform. The latent
nationalism of his party became state policy and resulted in widened mistrust and
deepening ethnic and regional divisions within the country (Marshall-Fratani 2006,
Kohler 2003). On September 19, 2002, military troops originating from the North,
mutinied and attacked major cities throughout the country, claiming control over the
northern region and establishing Bouake (the second largest city in Cote d’Ivoire) as
its base. During 2003-2004, violence escalated. Massacres of civilians took place espe-
cially in the South West and many presumed northerners in Abidjan neighborhoods
were arrested and killed (McGovern 2011). Actions by the international community
also provided an excuse for the pro-Gbagbo “Young Patriots” to stage violent riots
and attacks against West Africans, French and other foreigners.
While most fighting ended in 2004, the country was effectively split between north
and south by a “confidence zone” - set up by international peace keeping forces -
between the rebels and government forces (United Nations 2009). The reconciliation
process was not abided by and elections originally set for 2005 were pushed back
several times until late 2010. The 2005-2010 was described as a “no war, no peace”
situation characterized by uncertainty, severe disruptions of services and widespread
small armed conflicts (McGovern 2011).
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Figure 1.2 maps the conflict rate by department for the period before and after
2000 which shows a clear increase in the overall conflict intensity in the later period.
While social tension had increased in the country, the consensus among observers is
that violence at the scale witnessed in the 2000 elections and the election outcomes
were largely unanticipated before 2000.4 Thus it seems reasonable to assume that
prior to the 1999 coup, the turn of events leading to the election crisis and the civil
war in 2002 were unexpected to most individuals and firms. Based on this, we argue
that the conflict starting in 2000 was an exogenous shock.
3 Related literature
Our research contributes to the empirical literature on the economic consequences
of violence and civil conflicts. Until recently, this literature has largely been dom-
inated by cross-country and cross-region analyses. Not surprisingly, past research
often finds civil wars and political crises to have a negative economic cost, partic-
ularly in the short run. For example, Cerra and Saxena (2008) estimate that on
average, output contracts by 18% immediately following civil wars in a cross section
of 190 countries. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) study terrorist activities in the
Basque country and find a 10 percent gap between GDP per capita in Basque and a
comparable “synthetic” region.
Though informative, macroeconomic studies by nature are unable to address het-
4 The Economist (1998) for example, assesses Mr Gbagbo as “unlikely ever to come to power”.
An investment guide published in 1999 asserts that “Historically, private investment has not been
targeted” and “As the 2000 elections approach, further disturbances are likely but serious violence
has not characterized Ivorian political life in the past and is not expected to do so in the foreseeable
future” (Africa-Asia Business Forum: http://www.aabf.org/cote_divoire_inv_guide.htm)
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erogeneity associated with individual conflicts and the differential impact of conflict
on different groups within a country/region. More studies are now adding evidence at
the micro level, but due to data constraints, most of this research focuses on analyses
at the household level and on human capital outcomes such as health and education
attainment.5 Studies on the links between firms’ output and conflicts remain scarce.
Early papers on firm outcomes use stock market returns to get around data lim-
itations. For example, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) analyze how the cease-fire
declared by the Basque terrorist organization ETA in 1998-1999 affects the returns
of firms operating in the Basque Country relative to other firms. They find that
the truce announcement led to excess returns of firms operating in the region while
its end led to a small negative impact on their returns, suggesting a negative im-
pact of terrorism on expected investment returns. Similarly, Guidolin and La Ferrara
(2007) study the market’s response by diamond mining firms to the sudden end of
the Angolan civil war in 2002. In contrast to Abadie and Gardeazabal, they find that
diamond companies with concessions in Angola saw a drop of seven percentage point
in market returns compared to otherwise similar firms that held no concessions there.
The intuition is that conflicts can be beneficial or harmful to businesses depending
on the institutional arrangements where they operate. In Angola, conflicts might
have been beneficial to incumbent diamond firms because they helped deter entry
and make profitable unofficial dealings easier.
One concern with the above approach is that stock market data are typically not
available in countries impacted by civil wars. More recently, Collier and Duponchel
5 See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a broader literature survey.
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(2010) use survey data to investigate some channels through which conflicts can affect
firm performance in the context of Sierra Leone’s civil war. They propose that one
channel in which wars can have persistent post-conflict effects on firms is through
technical regress and loss of workers’ skills. The prediction is supported by the result
that 5 years after the war ends, firms were more likely to report willingness to pay
for staff training in those areas most affected by the conflict, indicating a shortage
of skilled labor. A lack of more detailed data prevents Collier and Duponchel from
confirming this result since it is not possible to determine the substitutability between
labor and capital at the firm level. Moreover, they only have data after the war so they
do no have a “control” period. Hence, there are concerns with omitted unobserved
factors as high intensity regions might have intrinsic characteristics that make them
more prone to conflicts and also affect the operating environments of firms. Collier
and Duponchel’s (2010) use distance to Monrovia (Liberia) to instrument for conflict
intensity but distance is a problematic instrument because it can also directly affect
output and productivity.
One approach is to find an exogenous event. Ksoll et al. (2010) examine the
impact of unexpected violence during the 2007 Kenyan general election on exports
by flower firms. The advantage of this paper is a cleaner identification strategy since
violence shocks were unexpected and did not equally affect all regions where the firms
were located. Thus Ksoll et al. are able to construct appropriate counterfactuals and
estimate the reduced form impact of violence on exports more reliably. They find
that violence in this period leads to a 38% drop in export volumes. Detailed survey
data allow them to further develop and estimate a structural model with endogenous
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labor supply. Simulations results show a 16% increase in operating cost if firms were
to induce workers to work overtime to compensate for workers’ absence caused by
fear of violence.
The external validity of these results is unclear. Ksoll et al.’s work is based on a
small sample size and it focuses on a highly specialized industry which is likely very
different from the rest of the economy. The only paper we are aware of that uses census
data is Camacho and Rodriguez (2010). These authors use instrumental variables
approaches in models with fixed effects to assess the impact of armed conflicts on the
exit of manufacturing firms in Colombia. They find that a one standard deviation
increase in the number of attacks (by region) results in a 5.2 percentage point increase
in the firms’ exit rate. Exit mechanisms however, are left unexplored in the paper.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study the evolution of firms’
productivity in a conflict context. As such, it also contributes to the growing literature
that examines productivity growth in developing countries. A paper closely related
to our research is Hallward-Dremeier and Rjikers (2011), who study the relationship
between firm survival and productivity before and after the 1997 financial crisis in
Indonesia and find an attenuated impact of productivity on firm’s exit during the
crisis. Among other explanations, Hallward-Dremeier and Rjikers suggest that regime
change and political connectedness might be determinants of this attenuation, based
on the premise that firms affiliated with the Suharto regime might have been hurt
disproportionally and were more productive before the crisis. However, firms might
have appeared productive as a result of connectedness or as a result of real technical
efficiency. Hallward-Dremeier and Rjikers mention but do not attempt to disentangle
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these two possible effects.
4 Methodology
There are various mechanisms through which conflict could impact individual
firms. The most obvious channel is through its effect on both factors of produc-
tion, capital and labor: buildings and machinery might be damaged or stolen, people
might die, get injured, migrate out of fear of violence or simply unable to show up at
work. Destruction of capital and labor, if on a sufficiently large scale, will likely alter
both their marginal product and marginal cost.
In addition, other factors might lead to changes in their relative prices. Uncertainty
in conflict situations might reduce the relative attractiveness of domestic investments
leading to capital outflows, driving up the cost of capital. Inter-regional migration
might either increase or decrease labor supply and consequently prices in a particular
location. If there are severe disruptions in any factors of production, firms may find
it optimal to change their technology altogether.6
Even if capital, labor and technology do not change, conflict likely causes out-
put/efficiency loss due to looting of output, bribe extortion or because businesses
have to stop operating when there is a high risk of violence. Further, destruction
of infrastructure and supply disruptions of intermediate inputs such as materials,
electricity and other utilities can drive up the operating costs. There is anecdotal
6 These effects have been documented empirically. Imai and Weinstein (2000) argue that reduced
private investment by a process of portfolio substitution is a primarily channel through which war
affects economic growth and find supporting evidence in cross-country data. Collier and Duponchel
(2010) suggest firms in Sierra Leon switched to using inferior technology after the war due to severe
shortages of skilled labor.
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evidence of these effects in Cote d’Ivoire 7. Firms’ operating costs might also increase
because they have to pay for “non-productive” inputs for security purposes to protect
their output and investments.8
Another channel of impact is through demand effects. Conflict is often associated
with reduced consumption due to reduced income. There are also potential changes in
preferences. In the context of Cote d’Ivoire for example, anecdotal evidence suggests
that some customers might divert their consumption away from foreign owned firms.
All these effects imply that the expected returns of investments may decrease. As a
result, firms might reduce investments in both physical and human capital. Moreover,
beyond these direct effects, conflict will likely increase uncertainty in terms of how
demand will change and how much violence will happen in the future, leading to
changes in investment dynamics.9 Firms with bleak current and future prospects
may opt out of the market. Heterogeneity in opportunity costs and all the effects
discussed above will determine how the responses differ across firm owners. In fact,
foreigners were reportedly leaving Cote d’Ivoire or looking to move their businesses
elsewhere after the 1999 coup (BBC 2000b).
Quantifying and disentangling all these transmission channels is difficult, particu-
larly without direct data on output/input losses or prices. We will present evidence
7 Africa Research Bulletin (2001 and 2003) reports widespread looting and property destruction
targeting businesses owned by West Africans and other foreigners after both the 1999 and 2002
coups.
8 Cross-country enterprise surveys find that the costs of security technology and services repre-
sented 13 percent of sales in Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, and 6 percent in Kenya
(World Bank 2011).
9 Bloom (2009) finds that uncertainty reduces investments because firms take a “wait and see”
approach. Further, Bloom et al. (2007) note that the partial irreversibility of investment and fixed
costs of hiring and firing influence the timing of actions and response to shocks. They find that firms
with adjustment costs is much less responsive to demand shocks than firms not subject to the costs.
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in section 5 which suggests destruction of capital and labor is not severe. Our analy-
sis employs a production function framework that uses available data on output and
firm’s use of capital, labor and material inputs10 to infer the reduced form net impact
of several other mechanisms discussed above. Specifically, we use an estimate of TFP
to capture the effect of output loss, “wasted” inputs and demand changes, by model-
ing their impact as an output distortion. Our estimation procedure does not identify
the effects of input prices, and investment and exit dynamics, but allows for them
under a number of simplification assumptions. Below, we present a brief conceptual
framework of our approach. The sections follow will discuss our empirical strategy in
more details.
4.1 Conceptual framework
Assume that firm i at time t produces according to a Cobb-Douglas technology.
Without any distortions, for a vector of inputs Xit = (X1it, ..., Xkit) used, the amount
of output is: Yit = e
AitF (Xit) = e
AitXα11it...X
αk
kit, where Ait is the technical efficiency
term and Yit denotes output. Suppose that because of the conflict, part of the firm’s
output is stolen and/or it has to halt operations for some fraction of the time, so
that the realized output is only a fraction of potential output γitYit. Further assume
that not all observed inputs are productive because for example, (i) a part of them
is used for security purposes, or (ii) they are imperfect substitutes of the inputs
normally used. Let λkit be the proportion of input Xkit that is actually used towards
production. The net effect of all these factors is equivalent to the firm facing an
10 It is also possible that firms might fudge their accounting figures to avoid extortion from the
government. Without a secondary data source, we cannot identify this effect.
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kit) < 0, so that the realized output
becomes: Ỹit = e
τitYit = e
Ait+τitF (Xit).
Increases in the absolute magnitude of τit reduce the output produced. There-
fore given the observed (or recorded) inputs, the measured TFP, which we define as
Ỹit/F (Xit), would be lower than the firm’s underlying technical efficiency. Effectively,
τit is a reduced form impact measure that captures the overall effects of output loss
and “wasted” inputs through the channels discussed above. Additionally, if output
is measured in monetary terms, as in our empirical implementation, changes in the
TFP term would also contain price (demand) effects. We expect the absolute value
of τit to increase with the intensity of the conflict. Because firms might be exposed
to violence differently, τit is allowed to be firm-specific.
In the context of Cote d’Ivoire, our conjecture is that as the conflict intensifies,
firms owned by foreigners or employing more foreign employees face greater distortions
because identity, in particular citizenship and nationality, is an issue at the heart of
the conflict. A larger distortion will correspond to a larger observed decline in TFP.










where conflictit is a variable that proxies for conflict intensity. Since Ait and τit are
unobserved, getting unbiased estimates of TFP first depends on the ability to es-
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timate F (Xit) consistently. If firms anticipate ωit and τit and incorporate them in
their investment, input purchase, and exit decisions then we need a framework that
can allow for such possibilities. Therefore, our empirical strategy involves two steps.
First, we follow Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (ACF, 2006) to structurally estimate
a production function. After getting consistent estimates of the production function
parameters, we can recover a productivity measure. As explained above, this produc-
tivity term will measure technical efficiency as well as any residual factors that cannot
be controlled for by observable inputs. In the second step, we regress the estimated
productivity term on firm ownership, foreign employment and its interaction with
time and conflict intensity, and other control variables to test hypotheses (1) and (2).
4.2 Productivity estimation
Assuming the production function is a Cobb-Douglas function in capital Kit and
labor Lit, we estimate its log transformation:
yit = βkkit + βllit + ωit + ηit (1.3)
where ωit = Ait + τit, lower case letters denote logs and the error term ηit captures
unanticipated shocks to output and measurement errors. In this framework, we can
estimate the TFP term if βk and βl are known. OLS estimation of βk and βl, however,
runs into an obvious simultaneity problem since high productivity firms may also use
more inputs.
ACF (2006) address this endogeneity problem by taking a structural approach in
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which an inverted function of the intermediate input demand is used to control for
productivity.11 The underlying structure is based on a model that derives industry
equilibrium with heterogeneous firms. In the model, firms maximize a discounted sum
of current and future profits, which are governed by exogenous productivity shocks
that follow a first-order Markov process. Formally, the productivity process can be
described as: p(ωt+1|{ωτ}tτ=0, It) = p(ωt+1|ωt). Hence, current productivity can be
written as a function of last period’s productivity and a white noise error:
ωt = E[ωit|ωit−1] + ξit (1.4)
There are two crucial timing assumptions in the ACF estimation approach. First,
capital is treated as a dynamic input. That is, investment iit takes place one period
before the new capital can be used in the next period: kit+1 = (1− δ)kit+ iit. Second,
labor, unlike intermediate inputs, is allowed to be a not fully variable input. It is
decided at time t − b (0 < b < 1) when only part of the current productivity shock
has been observed by the firm and before intermediate inputs are chosen.12 Suppose
productivity also evolves as a first-order Markov process between the (t−1, t−b) and
(t− b, t) sub-periods then lit would be correlated to ωit through ωit−b.
The only fully variable input is intermediate inputs mit. Because it is chosen after
both capital and labor, and after current productivity is observed, the material input
11 It is related to the approaches originated by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levihnson and Petrin
(2003) but includes additional timing assumptions to address collinerarity issues.
12 In the context of our research, it is a reasonable assumption since formal firms in Cote d’Ivoire
are subject to the Labor Code. According to the Bureau of International Affairs (1999), those
employed in the formal sector are generally protected against arbitrary discharge from employment.
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demand mit can be written as: mit = mt(kit, lit, ωit). ACF use the insight that mit can
be proven to be strictly increasing in ωit under quite general assumptions. Therefore
an inverted input function, proxied by a semiparametric function of capital, labor and
materials, can be used to control for productivity: ωit = m
−1
t (kit,mit, lit). Equation
(1.3) then becomes:13
yit = βkkit + βllit +m
−1
t (kit,mit, lit) + ηit (1.5)
Neither βk or βl can be separately identified from the above equation because the
function m−1t (.) also contains kit and lit as its arguments. It is however possible to
recover an estimate φ̂it where φit = yit − ηit. This term will prove to be useful in the
moment conditions identifying βk and βl.
Recall that the timing assumptions above imply that current capital and past
labor are decided before the current productivity is observed. Consequently, they are
both uncorrelated with the error term ξit in equation (1.4). Hence, the two following




] = 0 (1.6)
To operationalize these two moment conditions, we need to be able to write ξit as
13 Note that we do not have mit as an input in this equation thus yit can be interpreted as value-
added output. Alternatively, we can estimate a production function in revenue to recover coefficients
on intermediate inputs. Since increasing the number of unknown parameters put additional require-
ments on sample size, we choose to estimate value-added production functions to use our data more
efficiently.
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a function of the parameters and known quantities. From equations (1.3) and (1.5),
we have: ωit = φit − βkkit − βllit. Since current productivity only depends on its last
period’s value, we can approximate E[ωit|ωit−1] as another semipararametric function





14 ωit and ξit can be expressed as follow:
φ̂it − β∗kkit − β∗l lit = g(φ̂it−1 − β∗kkit−1 − β∗l lit−1) + ξit. This expression can be used to
form the sample analog of the moment conditions in equation (1.6) and estimate βk
and βl. In the empirical estimations, we use third-order polynomials to approximate
both m−1(.) and g(.).
In addition to endogeneity of inputs, we face a selection bias problem in unbal-
anced panel data if the probability of exiting the market at any given productivity
shock is correlated with inputs. This is the case if, for example, capital intensive
firms are more likely to stay following a bad productivity shock. To account for this
problem, we also estimate the production functions following Olley and Pakes (OP,
1996), which involves estimating an exit equation in past capital and investment and
using the predicted exit probabilities to control for selection.15 Nevertheless, ACF is
our preferred method for three reasons. First, the ACF method is robust to labor ad-
justment costs and firm-specific labor and capital price shocks.16 Second, investment
is often lumpy, especially in a developing country context such as Cote d’Ivoire, so
14 We use OLS estimates as initital values in the estimations.
15 OP’s methodology uses the inverted investment demand instead of intermediate inputs to con-
trol for productivity: ωit = i
−1
t (kit, iit). Because we only observe firms that survive, the cor-
rect expression for the g function which approximates the deterministic portion of ωit should be
g[ωit−1, P r(χit = 1)] where χit = 1 indicates survival. The selection correction is based on an exit
rule, which states that firms exit when productivity falls below a threshold so: Pr(χit = 1|Iit−1) =
Pr[ωit ≥ ωit(kit)|ωit−1] = ϕ(kit−1, iit−1). This probability can be estimated using a probit function
and the predicted values P̂it will be controlled for in the function g above.
16 Since the material input demand function includes both capital and labor, any price shocks in
capital and labor will be reflected in this demand function
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the monotonicity condition between investment and productivity in the OP procedure
might not be satisfied. Third, past studies often find negligible impact of controlling
for sample selection on estimated TFP. This is the case in our study, as discussed in
section 6.1.
Our empirical work assumes that 1) there is a common production function (in
value added) for firms in the same 2-digit industry; and that 2) the same functional
form holds for the entire sample period. Both assumptions are necessitated by sample
size limitations. Assumption 2 is justified by the fact that physical capital was not
destroyed to a large extent since the most intense fighting during the civil strife
happened outside of the capital city, and the majority of firms (86%) are located in
the capital. Moreover, given the short sample period, it is reasonable to assume that
firms might not have had the time to change their technology. As discussed above,
changes in expected returns and uncertainty during the conflict can affect investment
and exit dynamics.
To allow for changes in the material input demand (capital investment and exit
responses in the OP approach), we control for year fixed effects, so our estimation
procedure is robust to yearly shifts in material (investment) and exit functions. After
recovering the input coefficients βk and βl, we calculate the log of measured TFP as:
ω̂it = yit − β̂kkit − β̂llit (1.7)
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4.3 Heterogeneous impact of conflict
We can think of the estimated TFP from equation (1.7) as containing an underlying
technical efficiency index Ait and a distortion term τit, ω̂it = Ait + τit, which cannot
be measured separately unless one is prepared to introduce some additional structure.
We test for the hypotheses in (1) and (2) in the regression:
ω̂it = α0 + α1Foreignit + α2Foreignit × after +Witα3 + µi + µjt + µrt + εit (1.8)
where i, j, and r references a firm, an industry and a region respectively, and year is
indexed by t.
Here, after is a dummy variable denoting the conflict period, which equals one
if t ≥ 2000. Foreignit indicates whether the firm is classified as “foreign”. We
consider two alternative definitions, namely 1) whether the firm is foreign owned, and
2) whether it employs any foreign employees. These two variables pick up inherent
differences in efficiency between foreign and domestic firms, regardless of conflict-
induced shocks.
Our variable of interest is thus the interaction term between foreign status and the
conflict dummy. A negative and significant α2 would suggest that foreign firms were
impacted disproportionally by the increased conflicts since 2000. Our identification
assumption is, conditional on observables, firms have comparable levels and trends
in technical efficiency Ait so the variations in ω̂it during the conflict can be solely
attributed as the effect of the firm’s foreign status on the distortion τit.
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We include a set of fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity that could
be confounding with foreign ownership/employment. First, firm fixed effects µi cap-
ture all time-invariant unobserved effects correlated to foreign status and help mitigate
the problem with firms charging different mark-ups which will be reflected in the pro-
ductivity term (Pavcnik 2002). By including firm-level fixed effects, α2 is effectively
identified from firms that experience a change in their foreign status during the con-
flict. Second, industry-specific time effects µjt capture all events during the sample
period that affect all firms within a given industry equally. Foreign firms may be
representative disproportionally in certain industries and some industries may have
been affected more heavily by the conflict or by other macroeconomic shocks. Includ-
ing these fixed effects avoids incorrectly attributing industry effects to foreign status.
Another advantage of including industry-specific time effects is they can help capture
the effect of measurement errors in the industry level deflators used in the empirical
part (Amiti and Konings 2007). We also include region-specific time fixed effects µrt
to control for shocks overtime that affect productivity in all industries but may vary
across regions. This is important if there are spatial correlations in conflict patterns.
Vector Wit includes measures of firm size - log of total assets, a dummy indicating
whether the firm is above the median employment level and its interaction with time.
These measures of firm size address three issues: (i) firm size might affect productivity;
and (ii) if financial frictions are present, large firms might weather shocks better than
smaller firms and (iii) if firms are richer (have more assets), they are more likely to be
looted regardless of identity. We also include a dummy variable indicating whether
the firm’s age is above the sample median, plus its interaction with time to control
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for the possibility that older firms are more productive and are affected differently
during the conflict. If foreign ownership and employment are correlated with firm
size and age, then not controlling for these variables creates potential bias.
In an alternate specification, we use another set of variables to assess the effects
of civil strife:
ω̂it = δ1Foreignit + δ2conflictit + δ3Foreignit× conflictit + δ4Wjit +µi +µjt +µrt + εit
(1.9)
Here, foreign employment - Foreignit - is measured by two variables, namely
(i) the percentage of all foreign employees, and (ii) French West African and other
nationalities out of total employment. The conflictit variable measures the number of
armed conflicts per 100,000 inhabitants by the department where the firm is located
(see section 5.1 and the data appendix). As argued in section 3, we can consider
conflict intensity to be exogenous to the individual firms.17 The interaction between
conflict and foreign allows us to see if firms which employ more foreign workers fare
worse in situations of violence. Similarly to equation (1.8), we include the same set
of fixed effects and size in terms of total assets interacted with time. Testing the
hypotheses in (1) and (2) is equivalent to testing δ2 < 0 and δ3 < 0.
In all specifications, we cluster the standard errors at the firm level.18 In the last
specification, we use bootstrap standard errors, allowing for clustering, to account for
17 The total number of firms which changed their locations during the conflict is 30, representing
a negligible percentage of all firms in our data.
18 We also allow for clustering at the geographical level of the conflict variables (following Moulton
(1990)) but the resulted standard errors are smaller, possibly due to the unbalanced distribution of
firms in our data. Therefore, we report standard errors clustered at the firm level to be conservative.
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heteroskedasticity since we also have a generated variable on the right hand side of
the regression.
4.4 Endogenous foreign employment choices
A potential problem with above specifications is that foreign employment and
ownership might be endogenous since firms might make decisions about employing
foreigners/changing ownership after observing their productivity. If having foreign
workers during the conflict results in a negative impact on production, we might
expect firms to respond by reducing their shares of foreign employees. However, we
can observe less hiring of foreigners without a negative effect of foreign employment
on production if for example, foreigners were leaving the country, driving up their
relative wages. In this section, we outline an empirical test for such adjustment and
discuss corrections for the potential bias in the production function estimations above.
Our empirical test is based on a simple model linking wages and labor returns.
We assume that the share of foreign employees, denoted as ρit, has an impact on
production in the form of an output distortion so that (log) productivity is the sum
of technical efficiency Ait and a function ht(ρit): ωit = Ait+ht(ρit). The model implies
that the optimal choice of ρit is decreasing with its marginal product, conditional on






+ γ2t + ηit (1.10)
19 Model set up available upon request.
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where wfit and w
d
it denote the wage rates of foreign and domestic workers respectively.
Here, γ2t is a dummy variable indicating the conflict period. The hypothesis is γ2t < 0,
that is the share of foreign employees is decreasing with the conflict. We control for
firm-level fixed effects to account for any differences in the return of labor at the
industry level and other unobserved heterogeneity.
If there is evidence of firms adjusting their labor composition, the production
function estimations will need to be adjusted accordingly. The reason is that both
the ACF and OP estimation procedures relies on the assumption that the TFP term
depends on its past value and an error term that is uncorrelated with current capital
stock (see equation (1.6)). If ωit = Ait + ht(ρit) as in the model setup above and, for
example, firms with more foreigners are more capital intensive, then the coefficient
estimate on capital in the production function will be biased.20
To check whether our results are affected by this bias, we use the ACF approach
and include the percentage foreign employees, ρit, directly in the proxy function for
TFP: ωit = m
−1
t (kit,mit, lit, ρit). Intuitively, it means that firms take into account
the impact of foreign employment on production and thus the material input demand
function is also a function of ρit in addition to other inputs. We assume productivity
still evolves according to a first order Markov process so: ω̂it = g(Ait−1)+ht(ρit)+ξit.
Effectively we model the impact of foreign employment directly into the production
function and not through the unobserved component of productivity. In practice,
20 To see this, consider equation (1.5) above. The error term ηit and consequently φit will contain
information on ρit if it is not included in the proxy function m
−1
t . As a results, the error term ξit
calculated using φ̂it will contain information on ρit. Therefore, the first moment conditions in (1.6)
will not be satisfied if capital is correlated to foreign employment. For a more formal discussion of
the problem, see Appendix A.
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because this estimation procedure is much more data demanding, we assume that
ht is linear and only allow ht(.) to change once with a dummy variable indicating
the starting of the conflict. The effect of ρit over time is estimated directly from the
production function through ht(ρit). See Appendix A for more details on the exact
estimation procedure.
5 Data
Our analysis is based on firm-level data from the Registrar of Companies for the
Modern Enterprise Sectors, collected by Cote d’Ivoire’s National Statistics Institute
(INS), covering the universe of registered, formal modern enterprises for 1998-2003.21
The unit of observation is the firm. Almost all firms in Cote d’Ivoire are single-
establishment firms. The data set covers manufacturing, agriculture, trade and ser-
vices firms.
The Registrar of Companies collects information upon incorporation including
physical location, sector classification at the 3-digit industry level, and sharehold-
ings for all shareholders. The INS requires all registered companies to submit annual
filings with detailed financial and employment information including total wages, em-
ployee skill level, taxes paid, sales, and fixed assets, which are reported under the
West African accounting system standards, Etats Financiers Normalises du Systeme
Comptable Ouest Africain (SYSCOA). These firms, which operate in the formal econ-
omy, pay a range of taxes, benefit from bank finance and technical assistance, and
21 Our panel is shorter than the typical sample length in the TFP literature. However, it is longer
than most panels available in Sub-Saharan context. For example, Frazer (2007) uses a 4 year panel
while Soderbom et al. (2006) and Van Biesebroeck (2005) both have a panel length of 3.
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are characterized as having more educated owners (Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen 2002,
OECD 2004).
The structure of the data is an unbalanced panel. We define exit as a permanent
exit from the data (We do not consider temporary lapses in reporting as exits). Entry
can be defined unambiguously since we know the year when the firm starts operating.
The reporting requirement constitutes an important advantage of our data since entry
and exit from the data implies real entry and exit, unlike data from other countries
which usually require a certain employment or revenue threshold to be included in
the data.
Table 1.1 displays information about the composition of the sample. The full
sample includes 7010 firms there are missing values and potential outliers. For the
production function estimations, we exclude the top and bottom one percent of the
distribution of output and inputs. 22 As a result, we are left with 4161 unique firms
or 11810 firm-year observations. Table 1.2 shows the distribution of firms by panel
length. In general there are a larger number of missing values in the earlier years,
but all possible panel length (1-6) are well represented in our data. As mentioned, we
estimate separate production functions for 2-digit industries when possible. However,
since the sample size is limited for some industries, we also need to pool several
industries and estimate the same production function for these industries.23 Table
22 The results are very similar if we instead drop observations with abnormal (one-percent tails)
year-to-year growth in output and inputs.
23 We base our pooling on the similarity of the industries i.e. if they have similar capital labor
ratios. Nevertheless, we need to drop some industries with a very small number of firms and no
obvious similar grouping. These are electric and water utilities, ores and minerals, and petroleum
industries. We further exclude financial services and government, education and health services since
they are potentially very different from the rest of the industries.
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1.B.1 in Appendix B reports the resulting number of firms by industry.
We augment the INS data with population estimates from Cote d’Ivoire’s 1998
Census, GIS data on administrative boundaries and conflict data from the Armed
Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED, Raleigh et al 2012). The conflict rate
variable is calculated as the number of armed conflicts24 as reported per year by
department, per 100,000 inhabitants. Population data is taken from the 1998 Census.
The conflict rate ranges between 0 to 8.04 and the mean conflict rate is 1.28 for all
firms in the sample. The average rate of conflicts targeting foreingers increase from
0.63 to 2.38 after 2000. Figure 1.3 maps the distribution of firms in the sample in two
periods.25 It shows that firms’ concentration has somewhat changed over time but
the majority of firms still concentrated in Abidjan both before and during the crisis.
5.1 The firms
Summary statistics of the variables of interest are reported in Table 1.3, including
summary statistics for the sub-sample used to estimate the production functions,
which excludes observations whose monetary values are in the first and ninety-ninth
percentiles of the full sample. All monetary variables, including sales, value added and
material costs are deflated using the corresponding industry deflators taken from the
INS, where the industry classification is similar to the US 2-digit SIC classification.
The use of industry-specific deflators helps limit the problem of product/input quality
24 We include five types of events reported by ACLED: Battle-Government regains territory, Battle-
No change of territory, Battle-Rebels overtake territory, Riots/Protests and Violence against civil-
ians.
25 Since the coded location data was collected upon in-corporation, the data might not be accurate
if the firm has relocated. When the registered location does not match a firm’s physical address, we
use the city and department information from the address to recode the firm’s location.
28
or markup differences across industries being incorporated in prices. Investment and
capital are deflated using an economy-wide deflator due to a lack of more detailed
information. Recent papers have raised concerns that using monetary values instead
of physical output amount confounds productivity with mark-ups if there is still
considerable heterogeneity in market power within industries (see for example, Foster
at el. 2012). In the absence of data on firm-level prices or other information to infer
mark-ups, our estimated TFP will have to be interpreted as containing price effects.
Sample means and medians show a typical skewed distribution with mostly small
firms and few very large firms.26 A quick glance at some key characteristics suggest
that the quality of our data is reasonable. The average firm size, at 56 employees, is
close to estimates from other countries in the region. For example, Soderbom and Teal
(2004) estimate the average size of Ghanian manufacturing firms to be 67 employees.
The measure of labor productivity, sales per employee, is at around 80,000 USD. This
figure is comparable to China and Indonesia (see Bloom et al 2010).
We use information on shareholding, which is available for the sub-period 1999-
2003, to construct ownership variables for the firms. We observe nationality and
share values held by all shareholders in the firm but not their identity. We define
ownership of the firm as the nationality category with the largest total share. We
distinguish between Ivorian, French West African, French and other foreign ownership
to understand the differences in firm characteristics by ownership. However, in what
follows, we only distinguish between Ivorian and foreign ownership since we do not
26 Compared to the typical distribution of firm size in developed countries however, the formal
sector in Cote d’Ivoire exhibits a relatively smaller percentage of small firms and a greater percentage
of large firms - similar to findings from other developing countries (Klapper and Richmond 2010).
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hold any a priori hypotheses on the differences between different types of foreign firms
(except for French West African firms, which at any rate constitute a very small share
of the sample). Summary statistics of firms by ownership over the years are reported
in Table 1.4 and 1.6.
As shown in panels A and C of table 1.4, foreign owned firms in all years represent
a significant proportion of all firms in both the original sample and the sample used
to estimate TFP. At the same time, there are considerable changes of ownership over
the crisis years. By the end of the sample period, the percentage of Ivorian firms has
increased by almost 10% compared to the beginning of the sample period, picking up
the decline in French ownership. The distribution of ownership in a balanced sample
shown in panel B of table 1.4 suggests that part of the changes are caused by entry
and exit. This is confirmed in table 1.5 which shows that the majority of changes
in ownership happens in 2000. Table 1.6 compares the characteristics of firms by
ownership. Given their large percentage and significantly larger size, both in terms of
employment and total assets, foreign, and especially French, businesses clearly play
an important role in Cote d’Ivoire’s economy.
5.2 Firm entry and exit
Figure 1.4 shows aggregate trends in firm’s entry, exit and employment growth.
Entry and exit rates average over the entire study period at 11.7% and 25.2% respec-
tively. Both entry and exit rates show a clear break after 2000. Exit rate increases
from around 23% in 1998-1999 to around 27% in the 2000-2002 period. Entry rate
shows an even bigger gap between the two periods, from around 15% in 1998-1999
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to 9-10% in the later years. Aggregate employment also contracts from a net job
creation of about 10000 workers in 199927 to a net loss of about 18000 jobs in 2000
and decreases further in 2002 and 2003.
As shown in figure 1.5, foreign and Ivorian-owned firms have similar entry and
exit rates in 1999 but diverging trends of increasing exits among domestic firms and
decreasing entry among foreign firms starting in 2000. One possible explanation is
that foreign firms weather shocks better than domestic firms and thus are more likely
to stay in business. However, because foreigners have higher opportunity costs of
establishing businesses in the country given the conflict, they are less likely to enter.
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show that the spike in exit rates since 2000 is also accompanied
by an increase in the average size and age of exiting firms. Given the common finding
in the literature that larger and older firms are more productive, this trend suggests
that more productive firms might be exiting during the conflict.
These figures indicate a highly volatile economy comparing to entry-exit rates of
firms in other countries. It is difficult to find census data for other economies with
comparable income level but estimates from surveys in other sub-Saharan countries
indicate lower annual firm exit rates. For example, Soderbom et al. (2006) find that
the attrition rate for a sample of firms from Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania averages
6% between 1993 and 1999. Shiferaw (2009) reports annual exit rates from the man-
ufacturing census in Ethiopia, whose income per capita is about one third the level
of Cote d’Ivoire, to be 16% in the 1996-2002 period. In general, coinciding with the
27 The size of the total workforce in Cote d’Ivoire in the industrial sector is half a million (Bureau
of International Affairs 1999).
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surge of violence, the formal sector starts to show signs of contraction in 2000 as
evidenced by decreased overall employment, increased exit and decreased entry.
5.3 Output
Figure 1.8, panel A plots the simple trend in firms’ output - measure as log of
value added - over time (the base level in 1998 has been normalized to zero). It shows
a sharp decline in average output, which is 38-56% lower in 2000-2003 compared to
1998-1999, the pre-conflict period. In panels B and C, we plot the coefficient estimates
γ2t from the following regression:
yit = γ0 + γ1Foreignit +
∑
t
γ2tForeignit ×Dt + µi + µjt + εit (1.11)
where yit denotes log value added, Foreignit denotes foreign ownership/employment
and Dt are year dummies. The coefficients γ2t tell us the percentage differentials
between firms with/without foreign ownership and employment over time, conditional
on firm fixed effects µi and industry-specific year effects µjt. The results show that
output has been reduced by more than 20% for firms with foreign employees relative
to other firms beginning in 2000. The relative decline is the largest (35%) in 2003.
Foreign owned firms’ output has also decreased more than their Ivorian counterparts
but the difference is not significant until 2003.
Figure 1.9 shows the distributions of log capital and log capital/labor ratio for
the two periods before and during conflict. It shows that the distribution of capi-
tal has shifted somewhat to the left during the conflict but the reduction does not
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reflect a situation of severe destruction. The distribution of capital/labor ratios has
also decreased but not to a large extent.28 These observations lend support to our
assumption that firms did not change their technology during the conflict.
The observed trends in value added suggest that output of foreign firms has
dropped significantly more than non-foreign firms during the conflict. In the next
section, we present regression results using structural estimates of TFP in light of
the conceptual framework in section 4.1 to get at the causal impact of foreign owner-
ship/employment and conflict on firms’ production.
6 Results
6.1 Productivity evolution
Coefficient estimates of the (value-added) production function using the ACF and
OP approaches are displayed in Table 1.B.2, Appendix B.29 Using these estimates,
we plot the average firm-level log TFP and labor productivity (sales per employee) in
figure 1.10. ACF and OP productivity estimates follow each other closely, suggesting
that exit bias does not affect much the estimated TFP. Both estimates suggest that
average TFP has dropped substantially in the conflict period. More specifically, pro-
ductivity decreases by 12% and 18% in 2000 and 2001 respectively before rebounding
slightly in 2002. Firm productivity in 2003 remains at 10% lower than the 1998-1999
28 The statistics for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the equality of distributions are -0.1041
and -0.1298 for log capital and log capital/labor ratio respectively. The null hypothesis of equal
distributions before and after 2000 is rejected at 0.001 significance level for both variables.
29 Since the coefficient estimates on unskilled labor for group 3 (canned and food preparations,
beverages and ice cream, and other food products) and the capital coefficient for group 5 (wood
industries) are negative using the ACF and OP approaches respectively, we omit firms in these two
groups from our subsequent analyses.
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average. Since Cote d’Ivoire’s economy is heavily dependent on cocoa and coffee ex-
ports, the rebound in 2002 and 2003 might be partly due to a significant increase in
their prices in the international markets.
The trend in labor productivity is qualitatively similar. The trends in TFP and
labor productivity estimates match the pattern of average value added closely. In
fact, a simple regression of firm-level year to year changes in value added on changes
in TFP suggests that more that 80% of the changes in value added can be explained
by TFP changes. Given this result, TFP appears to be an important channel through
which firms’ output is impacted by this conflict.
6.2 Heterogeneous effects
The previous section provides some evidence that firm productivity has generally
declined since 2000, after the start of Cote d’Ivoire’s political turmoil. We now
explore whether the productivity decline is heterogeneous with respect to a firm’s
identity during conflict times. Given that the results using OP and ACF estimates of
TFP are very similar, we will only report regression results using the ACF estimates
in the main tables.
Table 1.7 reports regression results from the estimating equation (1.8) which in-
vestigates the impact of foreign ownership/employment on TFP during the conflict
period. Columns 1 and 2 report the results with foreign ownership while columns 3
and 4 report the results with foreign employment. The pre-conflict period is 1998-
1999 but the base year is 1999 in columns 1 and 2 because ownership information is
missing for 1998. Consistent with our hypothesis, the effect of foreign ownership and
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employment during the conflict period is negative in all specifications, but insignif-
icant in columns 1 and 2. This could be due to the fact that most foreign owners
are French and other European nationals and violent attacks against them did not
intensify until 2003.
Turning to foreign employment, having at least one foreign employee has a sig-
nificant and larger effect on TFP. This is consistent with the fact that most foreign
employees are French West Africans and violence against them started in 2000. The
coefficient estimate of the interaction term in column 3 implies that conflict reduces
TFP of firms with foreign workers by more than 20% compared to firms with no for-
eign workers. This effect is identified from within-firm TFP and foreign employment
variations, controlling for yearly shocks common among firms within industries and
regions. When further controlling for age and size interacted with time in column 4,
the estimated impact reduces to 9.7%. Given the functional form of the production
function, this TFP impact translates to an annual impact of around 10% of total
value added output.30
The coefficient estimates on size in terms of assets also have expected signs. In all
specifications, total assets have significantly positive effect on TFP, consistent with
results elsewhere that larger firms are in general more productive (see, for example,
Sorderbom 2006). Conditional on assets however, the results in columns 1 and 3
suggest that size in terms of employment and age have a negative impact on TFP.
30 Or approximately 6% of GDP since the formal sector’s contribution to GDP is estimated to
be 60% (Berthelemy and Bourguignon 1996). Due to missing data on value added and industry
price indices, we cannot accurately match Berthelemy and Bourguignon’s estimates using our data.
If we exclude all observations with negative reported value added and summing up nominal value
added across firms, the aggregate value added of all firms in our data corresponds to roughly 30%
of nominal GDP.
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These results seem to be driven by the differential impact of conflict on older and
larger firms. When controlling for the interactions of size and age with the conflict
dummy in columns 2 and 4, the levels of size and age are no longer significant. Since
firm size can affect various factors such as financial constraints and mark-ups, which
can be captured in our TFP estimates, it is possible for the estimated TFP of large
firms to decrease more during the conflict if these factors are changing differently for
small and large firms. There is however no clear theories for why age should drive
the magnitude of the the impact of conflict on firms conditional on size. A possible
explanation is that older firms are also more “visible” and thus are more likely to be
the target of attacks.
In addition to the above before-after specification, we estimate and graph the effect
of foreign ownership/employment in each year, α̃2t where t = 1998...2003, using the
model:
ω̂it = α̃1Foreignit +
∑
t
α̃2tForeignit ×Dt +Witα3 + µi + µjt + µrt + εit (1.12)
These graphs permit a visual and statistical test for the year-specific effects of foreign
ownership/employment on TFP. In these graphs, the value α̃2t where t = 1998/1999
represents a reference category set to zero (as ownership information is not available
in 1998). The results are presented in figure 1.11. The impact pattern of foreign
ownership/employment on TFP mirrors the pattern of value added found in figure
1.8. Figure 1.11A shows that the before-after specification above masks the significant
effect of foreign ownership in 2003, when anti-French sentiments became prevalent.
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The result suggests that having foreign ownership in 2003 reduces firm’s TFP by
18.8% on average. Conflict further reduces TFP of firms with foreign workers by 14.3%
in 2000 and 17.4% in 2003, respectively, relative to firms which only hired domestic
workers. Figure 1.11B also shows an insignificant effect of foreign employment in 1999
compared to the base year, justifying the parallel trend assumption for identification
in the before-after specification above.
The results so far provide evidence on how productivity changes with foreign own-
ership and employment over time, which is suggestive that the turmoil in 2000 and
2003 has a negative impact on foreign firms. However, it is not possible to identify the
overall effect of conflict on all firms given the time variation related to conflict will be
succumbed into the year fixed effects. To identify this effect, we exploit geographical
variations in conflict intensity and estimate equation (1.9). The results are presented
in Table 1.8. Conflict intensity is a significant determinant of productivity in all
specifications. An increase of one violent attack per 100,000 inhabitants reduces TFP
by 10-11%, which translates to a aggregate annual impact of around 13% compared
to the counterfactual of no violent attacks.31 This is comparable to the cross-region
results in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) but lower than the cross-country estimate
of 18% in Cerra and Saxena (2008).
Column 1 presents the results when we control for foreign employment as a dummy
variable and interact it with conflict intensity. The coefficient estimate suggests that
on average the impact of violent attacks on firms are 41.6% higher in magnitude if
31 We estimate this aggregate impact by summing up the predicted firm level TFP had the conflict
rate variable is zero, and compare it to the observed aggregate TFP.
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they have foreign workers. The results are qualitatively similar in column 2 where
we control for the interactions between the shares of foreign employees and conflict
intensity to allow for the effect of conflict on firms to vary with the degree of foreign
employment that they have. When French West Africans and employees of other
foreign nationalities are controlled for separately in column 3, only the interaction
with French West Africans shows a significant impact. Most likely, this is due to
the the small percentage of non-French West African employees in the sample. The
results in column 3 suggest that having an extra percent of French West African
workers increases the (negative) impact of violent conflict by almost one percentage
point. In aggregate, this effect corresponds to a 7% reduction in TFP over the sample
period.
6.3 Channels of impact and robustness checks
This section presents results from several tests to disentangle the potential mech-
anisms through which conflict affects TFP and other robustness checks. Table 1.9
reports results on channels of impact. Specifically, we consider demand effects and
effects on operating costs. Table 1.10 includes results from a set of robustness checks
in various sub-samples.
As noted above, our TFP measure likely picks up changes in mark-ups (see section
5.1). Hence, the result that TFP of foreign firms are decreasing more than domestic
firms might be driven by changes in both efficiency and demand. Since income as
a whole for the population was decreasing, it is likely that domestic demand for
goods and services produced by the formal sector was also falling. Therefore, firms
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that export part of their products might fare better than those depend solely on the
domestic market. On the other hand, it is possible that trade in general and exporting
firms suffer from instability. We test for which effect is stronger by interacting an
indicator of export orientation with foreign employment and the conflict dummy in the
before-after regression in equation (1.8). Since we do not have trade data at the firm
level, we use aggregate data from the INS to calculate an industry export orientation
index before the conflict.32 The coefficient estimates on the variables of interest are
reported in table 1.9, column 1. The interaction between foreign employment and the
conflict dummy is still significant and of similar magnitude while the coefficients on
export interacting with conflict and foreign employment are insignificant, suggesting
exporting has no net effect on all firms.
Another possibility is that firms with different market power would see different
changes in profits which is reflected in TFP. To test whether this channel is operating,
we control for an indicator that equals one for firms belonging to a highly concen-
trated industry at the beginning of the sample period (1998). An industry is defined
as high concentration when its Herfindahl index - defined as the sum of squared mar-
ket shares in value added - is larger than 1.4, or approximately in the seventy-fifth
percentile of the sample. We then control for this variable in an analogous way as the
export orientation variable before. The results are in column 2. The concentration
32 We calculate the share of exports over total output at two-digit industry level in 1999 since we
only have aggregate data from the INS for two years 1999 and 2004. In principle, we can use trade
data from other sources such as COMTRADE to calculate export and import shares at the ISIC
4-digit level and for all years. However, this approach does not work because we were unable to
match the industry indicator for more than 60% of the firms in our data with the COMTRADE
data. Approximately half of the industries (in terms of number of firms) do not export in 1999 so
we define export orientation as a dummy variable indicating non-zero exports at the industry level.
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dummy interacted with foreign employment and conflict is insignificant, suggesting
that productivity loss for foreign firms are present in both high and low concentration
industries.
Another channel through which trade may affect firms is if they use imported
inputs, which might become more costly with the conflict. Column 3 displays results
of whether firms in import oriented industry are impacted differently. The import
indicator is calculated in the same way as the export indicator above. The coefficient
on its interaction with the conflict dummy is negative and significant, indicating
this cost channel might be at play. The coefficient on the interactions with foreign
employment and conflict is not significant however. Thus increasing cost of imported
inputs does not appear to be a channel through which foreign firms were affected
more by the conflict.
As discussed before, conflict might lead to destruction of infrastructure such as
roads, causing firms with higher transportation cost to incur disproportionally higher
operating cost.33 Column 4 presents a test of this channel, using the share of trans-
portation cost over total sales at the firm level. The result suggests no significant
impact of transportation cost however, even though the signs of the interaction terms
are as expected. We also control for lagged instead of current transportation cost to
mitigate endogeneity concerns and did not find a different result.
One concern with the previous results is that they could be affected by sample
selection bias given we have to drop a larger number of firms from earlier years due
33 Moreover, this channel may be more important for foreign firms. In Cote d’Ivoire, anecdotal
evidence suggests that unrest in the country has led to an increase in the number of checkpoints on the
roads, and consequently an increase in the solicitation of bribes at these checkpoints. Furthermore,
foreigners are often discriminated and demanded higher bribes.
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to missing data. The sample selection issue is driven by that fact that we have to
fill in missing sector information for a large number of firms in 1998 and 1999 using
data from earlier/later years. As a result, firms that survive only one period are more
likely to be excluded. An ideal test would be to drop firms that exit after one period,
which would require dropping firms with a panel length of one. However, exit is not
known in the last year of data (2003) so such procedure implies a lower likelihood of
being included in 2003. To overcome this problem, we reestimate all of the specifica-
tions above using a sample where firms’ age is larger than one. This test effectively
excludes firms that survives one period with the caveat that inferences are only for
firms that are age 2 and above. The results are presented in column 1 of table 1.10.
The coefficient estimates are largely similar of significance and magnitude as before,
suggesting that sample selection is not driving our earlier results. Lastly, columns 2-5
report results from the regressions in equation (1.9) on the sub samples stratified by
size and age to account for the possibility that percentage foreign employees might
affect firms of different size and age very differently. The coefficients on the interac-
tions between conflict intensity and shares of foreign workers are qualitatively similar
but only significant for smaller and older firms.
6.4 Do firms adjust the shares of foreign workers?
Do firms respond to conflict pressure by hiring fewer foreign workers and adjusting
their workforce? Table (1.11) presents summary statistics which show that there is
significantly less hiring of foreign employees in general during the conflict, consistent
with our prediction. Table 1.12 present further econometric evidence from equation
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(1.10). In practice, we estimate this equation using the share of French West African
employees as ρt since they make up the vast majority of foreign workers and they are
mostly unskilled workers so the results are less likely to be confounded by skill level.
The results in column 1 and 2 are as predicted. That is, for firms with positive
foreign employment, the share of foreign employees is decreasing with the conflict,
after controlling for the relative wage of foreigners over Ivorians. To control for the
possibility that labor adjustment cost might affect how quickly firms can change the
share of foreign workers, we add lagged employment size and its squared terms and
interactions with time. The results are reported in column 2. The negative coefficient
on the interaction between size and conflict dummy indicates that bigger firms might
be slower to adjust but the effect is imprecisely estimated. Coefficient estimates of
the wage and conflict variables are qualitatively unchanged, suggesting our prediction
holds up after (partially) accounting for adjustment cost. Another important caveat
is we assume firms to be maximizing profits in the model and thus have not taken
into account the firm’s owner’s taste for employing Ivorian versus foreign workers.34To
the extent that larger firms might be more likely to behave as profit maximizers, the
results that larger firms are slower to adjust might also be driven by a taste-based
effect.
We have found suggestive evidence of firms adjusting the shares of foreign em-
ployment downward to mitigate the conflict impact. Tables 1.13 and 1.14 report
results from the production function estimations where such adjustment is taken into
34 Taste could also be changing with the conflict. If it does not change over time then fixed effects
can control for such concern.
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account. Effectively, the share of foreign workers is modeled as an additional (po-
tentially negative) input in the production function and its effect on productivity is
estimated directly in one step. As before, we define the start of the conflict as t ≥ 2000
and allow percentage foreign employees to have a different before and after effect on
production. Since the production function estimations are at the industry level, the
effect of foreign employment interacted with the conflict dummy is also allowed to be
industry specific. We find negative and significant effects for the interaction term in
five industries35 and no significant impact on other industries. The results for these
industries where we find a significant effect are reported in table 1.13. Using these
coefficient estimates, the aggregate cost of having foreign workers during the conflict
is estimated to be 5.4% of total output .
Next, we run the same production function estimations on sub samples of industries
stratified by size to allow technology to be different for small and large firms and
to make the percentage foreign employees more comparable across firms of similar
size. Because of data limitations, this exercise can be done only for industries with
sufficiently numerous observations. The results are reported in table 1.14. Here, we
only find evidence of negative impact of foreign employment and conflict for firms in
the Transport and communications and Commerce sectors and for larger firms in the
Chemical, rubber products and building materials sector. Lack of statistical power
might be responsible for the absence of impact in some industries but in general, these
results confirm the findings in the earlier sections that foreign firms were impacted
35 Mechanical and electrical products, Construction and maintenance, Transport and communica-
tions, Rental and management of buildings, and Commerce)
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more by the conflict.
7 Conclusion
Using firm-level data from Cote d’Ivoire, this paper has examined the heteroge-
neous impacts of political instability and violent conflict on firms in terms of efficiency
loss. Our approach relies on a measure of firm TFP derived from structural estimates
of the production function parameters. We argue that under fairly general structural
assumptions, this TFP term contains the reduced form impact of several channels
through which conflict might have affected firms, including (i) output loss due to
looting and extortion, (ii) increasing shares of unproductive inputs for security pur-
pose or due to idle capacity, and (iii) demand changes.
We find that the conflict reduces firm TFP substantially and having foreign own-
ership/employment magnifies the impact of conflict. The results are qualitatively
similar when we control for endogeneity of foreign employment using instrumental
variables or using an alternative procedure to estimate production functions. These
results suggests that the nature of the conflict, which spurred increasing anti-foreigner
sentiments, creates distortions that disproportionally affect foreign firms. In response,
we find evidence of firms employing fewer foreigners to mitigate the conflict impact.
Given the importance of foreigners in general and of foreign investment in Cote
d’Ivoire, our results suggest that recovery effort would have to entail restoring con-
fidence in the state’s commitment and ability to protect the interest of foreign in-
vestments and employees. Moreover, increasing hostility and discrimination towards
foreigners, as signaled by economic impacts, might further exacerbated the country’s
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already eroding social cohesion. Blattman and Miguel (2010) argue that if the costs
are borne unequally across groups, conflict itself could intensify inequality and social
discord, hence further aggravating factors that feed into the risk of conflict reoccur-
rence. In a society with a history of strong presence of immigrants and long standing
social disparity between the north and the south like Cote d’Ivoire, this concern might
prove to be important. Just before the Civil War started in 2002, a survey in major
cities by PEW Global Attitudes Project found that 78% of the survey respondents
rate “ethnic conflict” as a big problem facing the country. Indeed, the civil war that
erupted the following year confirms that view.
Our research is also of relevance for other contexts because the type of conflict
studied in Cote d’Ivoire - characterized by “low-intensity” but repeated cycle of unrest
- has become common in many other developing countries. Understanding how the
private sector is affected and adapts in these “no war no peace” situations is critical
in understanding the role of instability in underdevelopment in a large part of the
world. While this paper focuses on the specific conflict in Cote d’Ivoire and the
negative implications it has for foreigners, our approach provides a useful framework
to analyze conflicts/shocks in other contexts, which frequently impose asymmetric
costs on different groups in the population.
A limitation with our data is that we do not observe directly the type and magni-
tude of losses that firms incurred due to the conflict. We have used several firm and
industry characteristics to investigate potential mechanisms through which the con-
flict might have affected TFP. We find evidence consistent with a story of increasing
cost of imported inputs as a channel of impact and no evidence of demand effects
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driving the results. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out any mechanisms with certainty.
This is an area for future research.
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Figures
Fig. 1.1: Major political and conflict events












Annual conflict rate by department (per 10,000 inhabitants)
Note: conflict rate is calculated as the number of armed conflicts, divided by
the total population by department
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A: Average value added over time, where 1998’s level has been normalized to 0.
B: Impact of foreign ownership on value added over time, relative to 1999.
C: Impact of having foreign employees on value added, relative to 1998.
Coefficients from regression (1.11) are plotted in B and C. The dotted lines represent 95% CI, where all s.e
are clustered at the firm level
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B
A: Impact of foreign ownership on TFP over time, where 1999’s level has been normalized to 0.
B: Impact of foreign employment on TFP over time, where 1998’s level has been normalized to 0.
Coefficients from regression (4) are plotted in A and B. The dotted lines represent 95% CI, where all s.e are
clustered at the firm level
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Tables
Tab. 1.1: Panel information
Number of firms with missing No of firms with valid values
Year Capital Labor Value-added for K, L, value added
1998 345 331 922 1,879
1999 294 482 889 1,789
2000 274 462 693 2,078
2001 277 451 656 2,037
2002 224 358 608 1,941
2003 140 278 585 2,086
Total 11,810
Tab. 1.2: Panel length








Tab. 1.3: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Foreign ownership/employment:
Foreign ownership 10811 1.00 0.53 0.50 0.000 1.00
% foreign employees 16348 1.94 15.96 23.76 0.000 100.00
% foreign employees (if>0) 8473 25.00 30.78 25.15 0.021 100.00
% French West Africans 16348 0.00 12.62 21.27 0.000 100.00
% other foreign employees 16348 0.00 3.33 10.27 0.000 100.00
Production function variables (full sample):
Value added 17317 31.39 266.06 840.93 -410.79 9538.21
Capital 18437 23.73 402.90 1505.21 0.000 18026.10
Skilled labor 16409 3.00 19.63 88.52 0.000 2923.00
Unskilled labor 16409 4.00 44.07 245.50 0.000 10395.00
Total employees 16409 10.00 63.70 289.77 0.000 11019.00
Investment 18345 2.00 75.71 276.36 0.000 3348.71
Materials 17468 86.78 1037.25 3613.16 0.000 42397.08
Production function variables (after cleaning*):
Value added 11810 61.40 331.06 862.26 0.004 9525.39
Capital 11810 32.23 384.53 1310.81 0.001 17965.25
Skilled labor 11810 4.00 16.59 54.06 0.000 1650.00
Unskilled labor 11810 6.00 38.96 145.81 0.000 5443.00
Investment 11716 4.63 77.41 262.10 0.000 3312.97
Materials 11699 154.31 1199.72 3722.53 0.000 42397.08
Conflict variables (by department):
Conflict rate, overall 18771 0.67 1.28 1.02 0.000 8.04
Conflict rate, FWA 18771 0.99 1.43 1.60 0.000 10.95
Conflict rate, foreigners 18771 5.06 11.35 16.43 0.000 330.03
Other firm characteristics:
Total assets 16939 146.27 2318.00 12802.64 0.008 455305.38
Sales 16044 247.41 1834.04 5743.94 1.820 60890.87
Sales per employee 14503 23.44 77.41 325.69 0.007 14201.23
Age of the firm in years 18436 6.00 10.32 11.34 1.000 104.00
Notes:
1. Monetary values are in constant 000’s 1996 USD.
2. *The clean sample includes obs used in the production function estimations, where all obs
in the one-percent tails of any monetary input/output variables are dropped.
3. Conflict rate is the number of armed conflicts divided by total population by department
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Tab. 1.4: Percentage of firms by ownership
Year Ivorian FWA French Foreign - other Total
A: All obs with ownership information
1999 45.05 3.59 29.77 21.59 1283
2000 45.63 3.40 29.97 20.99 2382
2001 42.71 3.50 31.52 22.28 2002
2002 45.23 3.83 28.36 22.59 2116
2003 53.10 3.50 22.95 20.44 3028
Total 47.04 3.55 27.95 21.46 10811
B: Balanced sample with ownership information
1999 43.69 3.47 29.80 23.03 547
2000 39.44 3.28 37.74 19.55 885
2001 34.74 3.13 39.42 22.72 832
2002 35.66 3.37 38.55 22.41 830
2003 40.36 3.10 34.40 22.14 1224
Total 38.61 3.24 36.27 21.89 4318
C: TFP sample with ownership information
1999 42.18 2.83 31.27 23.72 742
2000 45.66 3.32 32.06 18.97 1566
2001 41.67 3.38 32.96 22.00 1332
2002 42.98 3.51 31.25 22.26 1424
2003 52.70 3.43 24.76 19.11 2072
Total 46.06 3.35 29.86 20.73 7136
Tab. 1.5: Transition rate in/out of foreign status
Year (t)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Foreign employment:
Total share of switchers 0.118 0.136 0.147 0.133 0.128
Zero in t− 1, positive in t 0.058 0.065 0.076 0.071 0.071
Positve in t− 1, zero in t 0.060 0.071 0.070 0.062 0.057
Foreign ownership:
Total share of switchers 0.398 0.068 0.051 0.065
Zero in t− 1, positive in t 0.174 0.034 0.025 0.027
Positve in t− 1, zero in t 0.224 0.034 0.026 0.037
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Tab. 1.6: Firm characteristics differentials between foreign owned and Ivorian firms
Means Relative differences*
Variable Ivorian FWA French Foreign-other N R2
Number of firms 4615 346 2733 2110 9804
Characteristics:
Log of total assets 5.669 0.667*** 0.619*** 0.217* 9804 0.202
Employment 86.343 22.591* 25.306* -1.735 9417 0.13
Percentage skilled labor 44.12 5.434** 3.721*** -5.819*** 9230 0.088
Percentage Ivorian workers 85.798 -9.925*** -9.861*** -10.324*** 9273 0.153
Percentage FWA workers 11.629 7.513*** 6.962*** 5.773*** 9273 0.161
Percentage foreign workers 13.905 9.689*** 9.831*** 9.821*** 9273 0.156
Log of wage 14.39 0.417*** 0.439*** 0.016 9377 0.072
Log of staff cost 17.116 0.461*** 0.609*** -0.057 9775 0.441
Log (VA/L) 2.234 0.359*** 0.409*** 0.11 8369 0.116
Log(K/L) 1.343 0.261** 0.088 -0.132 9146 0.107
Investment/lagged assets 0.1 0.004 -0.003 0.006 6712 0.038
Receivables/sales 0.257 0.031* 0.039*** -0.016 9224 0.103
Payables/sales 0.763 0.01 -0.034 0.014 8853 0.069
Notes:
∗ Coefficients from OLS regressions, controlling for year, industry & size FEs
(in equations without ln(total assets)/employment on the LHS)
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Tab. 1.7: TFP and foreign ownership/employment over time - full sample
Dependent variable: ln(TFPit) ACF estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign ownership 0.0426 0.0418
(0.0655) (0.0642)
Foreign ownership × after -0.0744 -0.0716
(0.0808) (0.0788)
Foreign employment 0.0961* 0.0170
(0.0505) (0.0506)
Foreign employment × after -0.203*** -0.0971**
(0.0483) (0.0487)
Ln(total asset) 0.259*** 0.296*** 0.214*** 0.245***
(0.0915) (0.0909) (0.0712) (0.0711)
Ln(total asset) squared 0.00296 -0.00103 0.00624 0.00267
(0.00921) (0.00919) (0.00731) (0.00728)
Size above median -0.272*** -0.00437 -0.201*** -0.0824
(0.0487) (0.0898) (0.0385) (0.0525)
Age above median -0.0427 0.0423 -0.0868** 0.0390
(0.0523) (0.0709) (0.0419) (0.0472)
Size × after -0.304*** -0.179***
(0.0881) (0.0503)
Age × after -0.108* -0.228***
(0.0645) (0.0468)
Firms FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry×year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region×year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.661 0.894** 0.824*** 0.666***
(0.404) (0.363) (0.187) (0.188)
Observations 6344 6344 10204 10204
R-squared 0.140 0.145 0.132 0.139
Number of firm id 3106 3106 4084 4084
Notes:
1. after indicates the conflict period 2000-2003
2. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Tab. 1.8: Impact of conflict and foreign employment on TFP - full sample
Dependent variable: ln(TFPit) ACF estimates
(1) (2) (3)




Foreign employment × conflict rate -0.0463**
(0.0191)
Percentage foreign employees 0.000100
(0.000953)
% foreign employees × conflict rate -0.000638*
(0.000387)
% FWA employees 0.000842
(0.00105)
% other foreign employees -0.00253
(0.00172)
% FWA employees × conflict rate -0.000936**
(0.000439)
% other foreign employees * conflict rate 0.000501
(0.000799)
Firms FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Region × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Total assets × year FE Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.300* 0.295* 0.290*
(0.170) (0.168) (0.169)
Observations 10287 10287 10287
R-squared 0.133 0.132 0.132
Number of firm id 4107 4107 4107




Dependent variable: ln(TFP )it Exporting Concentration Importing Transport
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign employment×after -0.117** -0.101** -0.105* -0.0979*
(0.0578) (0.0508) (0.0558) (0.0513)
Export oriented×after -0.445
(0.288)












Transportation cost×foreign emp -0.329
× after (0.661)
Notes: specifications1-4 include controls as in columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.7
1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2. Export and import orientation are industry indicators of positive export/import in 1999.
3. High concentration indicates industries with above median Herfindahl index in 1998.
4. Transportation cost: transportation cost/sales, measured at the firm level.
Tab. 1.10: Robustness checks in sub-samples
Age>1
Sample: below median Sample: above median
Size Age Size Age








% FWA emp -0.000883** -0.00152** -0.000582 -0.000551 -0.000968**
×conflict rate (0.000427) (0.000686) (0.000793) (0.000588) (0.000491)
% other foreign emp 0.000368 7.84e-05 0.000621 0.00123 -0.000234
×conflict rate (0.000812) (0.00125) (0.000926) (0.00104) (0.00119)
Observations 9500 4899 4958 5388 5412
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Tab. 1.11: Trends in skill and nationality composition
Mean Difference relative to 1998
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
% FWA employees 14.87 -0.918** -1.782*** -2.667*** -3.924*** -4.267***
% other foreign emp 3.65 -0.334 0.32 0.0363 -0.279 -1.659***
% skilled employees 40.91 -0.369 0.166 1.438 2.281** 3.575***
Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Tab. 1.12: Labor adjustments
Dependent variable Share of foreigners over all employees
(1) (2) (3)
After 2000 -0.0178*** -0.0179*** -0.0143***
(0.00403) (0.00402) (0.00502)
Wage ratio (firm level) -0.000974*** -0.00122***
(0.000299) (0.000375)
Size (lagged employment/1000) -0.00862
(0.0416)




Size2 × after 0.00273
(0.00261)
Constant 0.283*** 0.287*** 0.287***
(0.00250) (0.00281) (0.00529)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4412 4412 2764
R-squared 0.010 0.014 0.019
Number of firms 2035 2035 1381
Notes: all regressions are run on a sample of firms with wage data
1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
2. Foreign implies French West African (FWA) in all specifications.
3. Wage ratio: calculated as average wageIvorian/(wageIvorian-wageforeign).
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Tab. 1.13: Effect of foreign employment on productivity (endogenous foreign employment)
Industry group Mec. & electrical Construction & Transport & Rental & mgmt. Commerce
products maintenance communications of buildings
% foreign employees 0.00905 0.00558* 0.0129** 0.00752** 0.00184**
% foreign emp×after -0.00612** -0.00494** -0.00814* -0.00400** -0.00241***
After 2000 -0.405 -0.523 -0.102 -0.339 -0.281***
Clustered bootstrap standard errors *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Foreign denotes % foreign employees.
Tab. 1.14: Effect of foreign employment on productivity (endogenous foreign employment), by size
Industry group 6 10 11 13 14
Size small large small large small large small large small large
% foreign employees 0.0117 0.00975 0.0172 -0.00158 0.0219*** 0.00912* -0.000523 -0.00221 0.00214 0.00267*
% foreign emp×after -0.0233 -0.0340* -0.0111 -0.00410 -0.0116* -0.0131** -0.00111 0.00145 -0.00234** -0.00264**
After 2000 0.305 0.306 -0.237 -1.030 0.463 0.206 -0.342** -0.187 -0.307** -0.299***
Notes:
1. Clustered bootstrap standard errors *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Foreign denotes % foreign employees.
2. Size is measured in terms of employment. Small: below sample median. Large: above sample median (by industry)
3. Industry groups: 6 - Chemicals, rubber products, glass and building materials, 10- Construction and maintenance,
11- Transport and communications, 13- Other services, 14 - Commerce
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Chapter 2. The impact of affirmative action and equity regu-
lations on manufacturing firms in Malaysia
1 Introduction
During Malaysia’s most recent general election in May 2013, criticisms against
the country’s affirmative action policies became a leading attack argument from the
opposition party (The Economist 2013). This decades-old set of official ethnic dis-
crimination was first implemented in 1971 under the New Economic Policy (NEP)
to address ethnic tension between the Bumiputera (or “sons of the soil,” implying
ethnic Malays and other indigenous groups) and the Chinese. Initially introduced as
a temporary measure, most of the NEP policies have stayed on until this day even as
it is increasingly considered as a hindrance to the country’s efficiency as well as the
source of resentment by Chinese and Indian groups.
Widely regarded as one of the most comprehensive packages of affirmative action
in the world, the NEP policies include measures favoring Bumiputera in a wide range
of areas. In the public sector, large shares of university admissions and job quotas
are reserved for Bumiputera. In the private sector, companies had to ensure that at
least 30% of their shares as well as employment were held by this group. Government
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contracts also explicitly favor Bumiputera businesses (The Economist 2003, Jomo
2004). While affirmative action policies are also prevalent in many other parts of
the world, comprehensive pro-Bumiputera policies in the private sector is a unique
feature of Malaysia’s NEP.
There has been a relatively large body of analyses on the effects of NEP establishing
its effect in increasing the education level and asset ownership of the Malays (Ong
2012). However, rigorous research of its impact on the private sector is scant. In
this paper, I attempt to fill a gap in the literature by studying the impact of the
NEP policies on businesses. I focus on the manufacturing sector, which experiences a
regulatory change that relaxes the rule imposing equity restrictions on foreign-owned
firms. This rule, which previously required all firms above a certain size threshold to
reserve 30% equity for Bumiputera, was fully abolished for all foreign manufacturing
projects since 2003.
I set up a simple theoretical model to show that the original policy results in
a distortion that renders some firms to stay below their optimal employment size.
Moreover, the policy change leads to two effects: (i) foreign firms are less likely to
be sized constrained, and (ii) their average size increases relatively to other firms.
My empirical analysis uses data from two rounds of the Malaysia Productivity and
Investment Climate Survey in 2002 and 2007. I test for the above predictions in
a reduced-form difference-in-difference framework. More specifically, I compare the
outcomes of foreign and domestically owned firms between the first and the second
survey rounds, which correspond to before and after the policy change.
My empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. I find that the
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policy significantly increases employment in foreign firms by 18-19%. Foreign firms
that are below the size threshold in the first period are also 20% less likely to report
that they are operating below the optimal level of employment. Further estimates
with alternative definitions of foreign ownership and sample selection suggest that the
results are robust. Moreover, I check for whether my results could be caused by an-
other policy change in this period which relaxes regulations on expatriate employment
and find evidence suggesting that this not the case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional
background, emphasizing the NEP policies in the manufacturing sector and the policy
change in 2003. Section 3 presents a brief review of the literature. In section 4, I set up
a theoretical model to motivate my hypotheses about the impact of this policy change
on firms’ employment size. Section 5 introduces the data and empirical framework
used to test these hypotheses. Section 6 discusses the empirical results. Section 7
concludes.
2 Institutional background
Malaysia is a multi-racial country with a history of strong ethnic disparities and
severe marginalization of the Bumiputera in economic activities. The ethnic compo-
sition in Malaysia is roughly 60% Bumiputera, 25% Chinese and the rest Indian and
other ethnic groups. However, at the end of the British rules in 1957, Bumiputera
accounted for only 2.5% of corporate assets against over 30% for the Chinese (The
Economist 2003). Inter-ethnic tension between the Bumiputera and the Chinese es-
calated and eventually erupted into street riots on May 13th 1969. This single event
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led to 200 deaths and prompted the government to respond with one of the most
comprehensive packages of affirmative action in the world.
The set of affirmative action policies were introduced in 1971 through the New
Economic Policy (NEP). The rhetoric focus of the NEP was both “poverty eradi-
cation regardless of race” and “restructuring society to eliminate the identification
of race with economic function”. In practice however, it had grown to emphasize
and be associated mainly with the second objective (Jomo 2004). Overall, the NEP
intended to pursue (a) correction of income imbalances existing between Bumiputera
and other ethnic groups; (b) restructuring of the employment pattern; (c) restruc-
turing of the inter-ethnic ownership of share capital in limited companies; and (d)
the creation of a Bumiputera commercial and industrial community. The NEP set a
specific target of 30 per cent ownership and control of the corporate sector by Malays
and Malay interests by 1990. In addition, it also proposed that the Malays, who
represent half of the population, proportionately participate in the commercial and
industrial sectors which should lead to realization of a Bumiputera commercial and
industrial community. With regard to employment, it expected private sector com-
panies to accommodate at least 30 per cent of managers/senior management from
among Bumiputeras (Onozawa, 1991).
While the NEP officially ended in 1990, most of its policies of favoring the Bu-
mipuera still remains in effect through Malaysia’s subsequent National Development
Policy (NDP) for 1991-2000 and the National Vision Policy (NVP) implemented from
2001. Below, I describe in more details the Bumiputera equity and employment quo-
tas in the manufacturing sector. Next, I present a discussion on the criticisms of these
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policies and the change in equity requirements that will be analyzed in this paper.
2.1 Affirmative action and policy instruments in manufacturing
The NEP comprises a wide range of policies in education, public sector employ-
ment, business and asset ownership. My focus in this paper is the rule in the manu-
facturing sector that 30% equity and employment of private firms have to be reserved
for Bumiputera. The main policy instruments used to enforce this requirement are
implemented under the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) 1975. The ICA primarily
aims to direct growth in the manufacturing sector through its approval of manufac-
turing licenses. This license is essential for firms above a certain size threshold to
operate legally or to obtain any formal government incentives, government contracts
and to participate in exports.
For private manufacturing firms, the latest ICA revision requires that all manu-
facturers with size above 75 employees or with shareholders’ funds exceeding RM 2.5
million to apply to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) for a
license (MIDA 2012). The approval of this license as well as any expansion and di-
versification projects is conditional on whether the NEP guidelines of minimum 30%
Bumiputera participation have been met in shareholders’ equity, employment share,
Board of Directors and appointment of Malay distributors (Searle 1999).
2.2 Regulatory changes in the sample period
The effects of this equity policy are controversial. On the one hand, it is widely
considered to have successfully created a Malay urban middle-class in the span of a
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little over a generation (Ong 2012). Even the most conservative government estimates
put the share of business equity owned by Bumiputera in 2004 at 18.7% (Centre
for Public Policy Studies 2005). On the other hand, many criticisms are directed
towards the inefficiencies that the policy creates. What the policy meant is that
large companies are required to restructure their ownership to ensure Bumiputera’s
participation either through individual involvement or trust agencies. As a result,
the policy’s most deleterious effects was probably due to the fact that it introduced
so much uncertainty into businesses planning that it was a disincentive against which
all forms of incentive appeared unattractive (Searle 1999, Gomez and Jomo, 1999).
Many Chinese companies are believed to have chosen to stay small and private, rather
than growing to the point of having to comply with the NEP’s requirements. Critics
also argue that the policy has acted as a barrier to foreign investment and that only
the Malay elite has benefited from it (The Economist 2003, 2009). An early estimate
puts the amount of capital flight due to the ICA’s pro-Bumiputera requirements at
12 billion USD from 1975 to 1984 (Lee 2002).
The policy proves to be increasingly unsustainable given competition for foreign
investments from neighboring countries. As a result, to attract foreign investment,
since June 2003, Malaysias government fully liberalized equity holdings in all foreign
manufacturing projects (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2004). The new equity
policy also applies to companies that operated prior to the changes but only recently
became large enough, that is, exceeded shareholders’ funds of RM 2.5m or those that
engage 75 or more full-time employees, and are thus required to be licensed.
In this paper, I aim to test empirically whether this regulatory change has any
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impact on firm size in terms of employment. The reason to focus on firm size in
terms of employment as opposed to equity is due to data availability. My sample
covers only two years of data and the percentage of firms that started business during
the sample period is negligible (see Data section). Given raising equity is a rare event
for firms, it is infeasible to analyze the impact on equity using the available data.
3 Literature review
While many analyses of Malaysia’s NEP policies exist, the majority contains de-
scriptive statistics documenting trends in different outcomes for Bumiputera and other
ethnic groups over time. The only two existing rigorous studies that I am aware of
focus on the effects in education, employment and wages. A recent paper by Ong
(2012) looks at the NEP impact in public education, and suggests that affirmative
action in secondary education did not affect the earnings of Malay secondary school
graduates relative to their Chinese counterparts. Conversely, since there is capacity
constraint in tertiary education, quotas reserved under the NEP led to an increase
in the Malay-Chinese wage gap among tertiary graduates. In an earlier study, Fang
and Norman (2006) document the widening Chinese/Malay (positive) wage gap since
the NEP adoption using household data from the Malaysian Family Life Survey. To
explain this gap, they introduce a model with two features: (i) there is imperfect
information about skills in the labor market, and (ii) exclusion to public jobs creates
better incentives for the minority group to invest in private sector skills. As a result
of discrimination policy, the minority group is able to overcome informational free-
riding problem. If this positive effect outweighs the direct effect in the public sector,
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it is possible for them to have higher wage in equilibrium.
My paper contributes to understanding of the NEP’s impact in the private sector. I
specifically consider a policy change that aims to address one of the NEP’s criticisms.
As a study on firm size distortions, my paper is also related to the recent literature
on misallocation of resources and its consequences for aggregate productivity. This
literature has shown theoretically and empirically how distortions in the labor or
capital market can reduce aggregate output through allocating resources away from
high productivity to low productivity firms. For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009),
one of the most prominent papers in this literature, documents that misallocation
can account for a large proportion of the productivity gap between China, India and
the US.
A paper more closely related to my research is Garicano, LeLarge and Van Reenen
(2013). They examine a specific set of labor laws in France as the source of distortion
rather than using a theoretical distortion term as in most of the rest of the literature.
The paper shows that these regulations, which impose significant labor costs on firms
that exceed a certain size, lead to firms inefficiently staying below this size. Structural
estimations using census data suggests the cost due to this size distortion can range
from 1-5% of GDP, depending on wage flexibility. Similarly, Braguinsky, Lee and
Regaterio (2011) show that Portugal’s strong labor protection laws have contributed
substantially to the continuing shift of the Portuguese firm size distribution to the
left. Their calibration exercises indicate that large growth effects could arise if the
distortions were lessened or abolished altogether.
A limitation of my work compared to these papers is a much smaller sample size
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since I use survey data instead of census data. Moreover, my analysis cannot consider
general equilibrium effects. On the other hand, I am able to observe a policy change
during my study period, and this allows me to examine how firm size can be affected
by actual changes in the extent of the policy distortions.
4 Model and hypotheses
In this section, I present a simple theoretical model to demonstrate the impact of
the policy change on firm size. Assume that the firm produces output Y following a
Cobb-Douglas function in capital K, labor L and productivity A drawn from some
f(A) distribution. Let π(A) then be the profit function of the firm:
π(A) = AKαLβ − (r + γ̄)K − (w + τ̄)L, with

γ̄ = 0, τ̄ = 0 if L ≤ L̄
γ̄ = γ, τ̄ = τ if L > L̄
where r is the rental rate of capital and w is the wage rate. When employment passes
a certain size threshold L̄, the firm incurs additional costs in terms of both labor and
capital. This assumption follows the regulation that firms have to reserve 30% equity
and employment to Bumiputera once their size gets past 75 full-time employees.1 If
search cost for Bumiputera shareholders and employees are higher on average then
these additional costs, γ and τ , are positive.2 In other words, firms above the size
1 I model these costs as variable costs only. There might also be fixed costs given the firm has to
restructure but adding fixed costs does not change the comparative statistics in this set up.
2 This is likely the case since Bumiputera employees are in general less skilled than Chinese and
foreign workers. In addition to search cost for Bumiputera shareholders, there might also be disutility
cost of diluting shares. Searle (1999, p.44) for example, claims that the ICA was vigorously opposed
by both Chinese and foreign business, who “loath to transfer 30 percent equity to Malays”.
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threshold L̄ incur higher per unit capital and labor costs.3
The first order conditions for the profit maximization problem of the firms with








= w + τ̄
From these FOCs, the optimal labor choice for the firm is given by:




⇔ A = L1−α−β(r + γ̄)α(w + τ̄)1−αδ (2.2)
where δ = βα−1/αα.
From equation (2.1), it is clear that the firm’s optimal size is increasing in its
productivity A. Moreover, equation (2.2) shows that the values of A that make a
firm unconstrained in choosing its size (in other words, when the firm can choose its
optimal L according to the FOCs) are:

A ≤ A1 = δL̄1−α−βrαw1−α
A > A2 = δL̄1−α−β(r + γ)α(w + τ)1−α
3 This assumption of higher total capital cost for firms above L̄ depends partly on the assumption
that r does not change with size. It might be violated for very large firms if they are able to borrow
sufficiently more cheaply, for example, because of investment incentives or because of market power.
Nevertheless, it is likely to hold for firms close to the size threshold.
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where A1 < A2 given the assumptions that γ, τ > 0 and α, β ∈ (0, 1).
For all productivity draws between (A1, A2), the firm is constrained in its size.
At A = A1, the optimal size is L = L̄. Since optimal size is increasing in A, it
follows that all firms whose A ∈ (A1, A2) also choose L = L̄. At A = A2, the firm is
indifferent between staying below and going above the size threshold since profits are
equal under those two choices.
In summary, firms with productivity below A1 optimally stays under L̄. Firms with
productivity above A2 can also choose their labor optimally above L̄. For firms whose
productivity are in between A1 and A2, they are size constrained and choose to hire
exactly L̄ workers. Intuitively, these are the firms with productivity values such that
it is too costly to hire more labor than the threshold and subject to the additional
costs. However, their productivity is high enough so that they would like to have size
larger than L̄ if not for the distortion caused by the size-dependent regulation.
Now suppose the policy changes so that a subset of firms no longer have to satisfy
the 30% Bumiputera equity condition. In other words, there is no additional capital
cost, i.e. γ̄ = 0 when L > L̄, when these firms exceeds the threshold L̄ (additional
labor cost still present since the 30% Bumiputera employment condition is still in
place). As a result, the upper bound of A such that a firm is no longer size constrained
becomes smaller for a subset of firms. Let this threshold be Ã2 then:
Ã2 = δL̄1−α−βr′α(w′ + τ ′)1−α < A2 = δL̄1−α−β(r′ + γ′)α(w′ + τ ′)1−α
Note that there is a new subscript on wages and capital rental rates as well as their
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additional costs in the above expression. In a general equilibrium model, changes
in firms’ labor demand can change the equilibrium prices of labor and capital. For
simplicity, I am only using a partial equilibrium model and do not model these effects
but allow for prices to be different with the policy change.
Denote the set of firms that are subject to the policy change as F . If all firms have
the same support of the productivity draw A then the proportion of firms ∈ F that
are constrained to be too small is smaller under the new policy change :
Pr(L < Loptimal)|∈F =
∫ Ã2
A1




We can also predict how the the average firm size changes with the policy given the
new productivity threshold. The average size for firms not affected by the regulation
change is then4:
E(L)|/∈F = E(L)|A<A1Pr(A < A1) + L̄Pr(A1 < A < A2) + E(L)|A>A2Pr(A > A2)
= E(L)|A<A1Pr(A < A1) + L̄[Pr(A1 < A < Ã2) + Pr(Ã2 < A < A2)]
+ E(L)|A>A2Pr(A > A2)
where E(L) is the average firm size in any range of A given equation (2.1).
4 The expression below ignores the lower threshold of A which results in zero profits. In the non-
trivial case where this threshold is below A1, the results do not change since the threshold would be
the same regardless of whether the firm is subjected to the regulation change or not.
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The average size for firms that are affected by the regulation change is:
E(L)|∈F = E(L)|A<A1Pr(A < A1) + L̄Pr(A1 < A < A2) + E(L)|A>A2Pr(A > A2)
= E(L)|A<A1Pr(A < A1) + L̄Pr(A1 < A < Ã2) + E(L)|A>Ã2Pr(Ã
2 < A < A2)
+ E(L)|A>A2Pr(A > A2)
From the above two equations, it clearly follows that foreign firms have higher size
on average. Intuitively, the average size of foreign firm has to be higher since there is
a range of productivity where foreign firms can choose size above L̄ optimally while
other firms cannot..
In summary, these predictions form the following hypotheses, which will be tested
empirically:
Hypothesis 1: The average size of foreign firms increases after the regulation
change.
Hypothesis 2: The relative probability of foreign firms being constrained to be too
small decreases after the regulation change.
5 Empirical tests
5.1 Data
My analysis is based on two rounds of data from the Malaysia Productivity and
Investment Climate Survey (PICS) I and II. The first and second rounds are conducted
in 2002 and 2007 respectively, thus covering firms both before and after the regulation
change in 2003. These surveys are part of the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey series
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and are jointly conducted with the Government of Malaysia. The surveys include
firms in both manufacturing and business support services sectors. However, I only
use data for manufacturing firms, which are subject to regulations by the ICA.
The two rounds share a similar sampling method and the same sets of question-
naires. The sampling frame comes from the Central Register of Establishments main-
tained by the Department of Statistics. Samples are drawn following a single-stage
stratified sampling method. Within each sector, firms are stratified by location and
industry, and are drawn proportionally according to the total sample size.5 They are
representative of the whole economy but only establishments with employment size
above 10 are included for the manufacturing sector (World Bank 2009).
The data cover identification information such as firm location, year starting op-
eration, legal status as well as detailed ethnic and nationality composition of share-
holders. Firms’ economic activities are defined according to Divisions (2-digit codes)
under the Malaysia Standard Industrial Classification (MSIC) 2000, which is identical
to the ISIC Rev. 3.1 up to the 4-digit level. The final sample size for manufacturing
firms is 1115 and 902 observations in the first and second survey round respectively,
of which 976 are panel observations. Table 2.1 presents the distribution of firms by
industry in both rounds. Figure 2.2 displays the distribution of firms by age group.
It shows that the presence of newly established firms is negligible this data set. As
explained above, this limitation is partly the reason for my analysis to focus on em-
ployment instead of equity as an outcome.
5 The PICS sampling unit is establishment. I use firm and establishment interchangeably from
here onwards.
75
The firm questionnaire includes questions on firms’ opinions about investment
climate that are standard in the Enterprise Survey series as well as recall balance
sheet information on employment, capital, investment, etc. Balance sheet data are
available for 6 years, 1999-2001 and 2004-2006.
Ethnic and nationality of shareholders are only available for 2 years (2001 and
2006). Table 2.3 shows the firm-level average percentages of shares held by each
group of shareholders by survey round. Since these are my main variables of interest,
my analysis makes use of only these two years of data. Table 2.4 shows the pooled
summary statistics of firm characteristics for 2001 and 2006. About 28% of firms in
the sample can be classified as foreign (defined as 30% or more shares being held by
foreigners). Roughly half have either more than 75 permanent workers or sharehold-
ers’ equity above 2.5mil RM and are thus subject to the licensing requirement under
the ICA. Given these percentages, my sample has relatively good balance of firms in
the “treated” and “control” groups (defined below).
5.2 Model and estimation strategy
I test Hypotheses 1 and 2 using a difference-in-difference (DID) approach. Given
the timing of the policy, the post “treatment” period is the second wave of the survey.
I define the “treated” group as firms that are foreign-owned, as they are the ones that
are subjected to the regulatory change. Domestic firms then constitute the “control”
group.
The above definition is dictated by data availability. Ideally, one would want to
define the treated and control groups more precisely according to the firm’s size in
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2001. The ideal treated and control groups would be foreign firms that are just below
the size threshold in 2001, and domestic firms of the same size, respectively. However,
this categorization is not feasible due to the small sample size. Figure 2.1 displays
the distribution of firms in both sample periods, showing that the percentage of firms
close to the size threshold is relatively small. For example, only 11% of firms in the
panel sample have between 50-75 employees in 2001, which results in a total of only
100 panel observations.
Alternatively, since only foreign firms in the manufacturing sector are affected by
the policy change, foreign firms in the services sector can also serve as the control
group. This construction of control and treatment groups is likewise infeasible how-
ever since I only have data for services firms in the second period. In sum, I use the
full sample of manufacturing firms. I will also consider the sub-sample of firms which
were below the size threshold in 2001. Intuitively, these are the firms where we should
observe a larger impact of the policy change. Table 2.5 presents summary statistics of
the firms by their treatment status, both before and after the policy change. Foreign
firms are generally larger both in terms of employment and assets, which suggest that
the DID analysis needs to control for these differences.
Hypothesis 1 is tested in the following linear regression:
ln(emp)it = αi0 + α1Foreignit + α2after+ α3Foreignit × after+ α4Xit+ εit (2.3)
where ln(emp)it is log of the total number of all permanent employees at firm i in year
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t.6 Foreignit is an indicator denoting if at least 30% shares of the firms are owned by
foreigners,7 and after denotes the second survey round. Controlling for the period
dummy takes into account the effect of any other factors that could affect all firms
to the same extent. I also control for Foreignit given that foreign firms are often
different from domestic firms in various characteristics, including size. In addition, I
include in Xit a set of city fixed effects (FE), industry FE and their interactions with
time. Since foreign firms can be disproportionally represented in certain locations and
industries, controlling for these FE ensures that my results are not due to confounding
effects of other policies that are location or industry-specific and constant throughout
the study period. Finally, I include firm FE to control for productivity and other
time-invariant unobservables that could be correlated to foreign ownership and affect
firm size at the same time. Because the panel sample is significantly smaller than the
pooled sample, I also run equation (2.3) without fixed effects and control for firm age
in those specifications to test for the prediction in the full sample.
The coefficient of interest is α3. Testing Hypothesis 1 is equivalent to testing α3 >
0, that is, if foreign firms are becoming larger on average in the second period. My
identification assumption is that conditional on firm FE and other controls included in
Xit, there are no omitted effects impacting employment of foreign firms and domestic
firms differently over time so the DID results can be attributed to the policy change
that affects only foreign firms.
6 This measure is taken from the section on “Labor and human resources” in the firm question-
naire. I do not include temporary workers since part-time employment is included in the number of
temporary workers and the size threshold in the ICA regulation is with respect to full-time employees
only.
7 I will consider other indicators of “foreign” in the robustness checks.
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For testing Hypothesis 2, the question used to construct my dependent variable
comes from the questionnaire’s section on labor relations. More specifically, the ques-
tions asks: “Given your current level of output, if you were free to choose without
restrictions your current level of employment what percentage of the current level
would you choose?”. I construct a categorical variable which takes the value of 1,2
and 3 if the firm response is more than 100 percent, equal to 100 percent, and less
than 100 percent respectively. I test for Hypothesis 2 in the following generalized
ordered logit specification:
Pr(yi > k) = g(δk + Ziβk) =
exp(δk + Ziβk)
1 + exp(δk + Ziβk)
(2.4)
where
Ziβk = βk1Foreignit + βk2after + βk3Foreignit × after + βk4Xit
and k = 1, 2, ..,M −1. M denotes the number of categories of the dependent variable
(M = 3 in this case). I consider both the general case where the slope β’s are allowed
to differ across k and the more parsimonious model where β’s are restricted to be the
same (the ordered logit).
As in the previous regression, I include the set of firm characteristics and fixed
effects in X to control for possible correlations of foreign ownership with other factors
affecting firm size. The coefficient of interest is βk3 where k = 1. However, since
coefficient estimates in this model are often hard to interpret,8 I will report marginal
8 Hypothesis 2 states that the probability of foreign firms constrained to be too small decreases
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effect estimates. Hypothesis 2 implies a negative marginal effect of the interaction
term Foreignit × after on the outcome yi = 1.
6 Results and discussion
6.1 Main results
Table 2.6 presents results from equation (2.3).9 Column (1) show the results in
the pooled sample with the full set of time-varying city and industry FE. The results
show that foreign firms are larger on average. The coefficient on the interaction term
between foreign and the period dummy indicates their size increases by 16.3 percent
after the regulation change but it is not significant. Column (2) shows the results in
the panel sample with firm FE. The effect of being foreign owned becomes negative
but insignificant when firm FE are controlled for. The policy change effect in this
specification is smaller than in column (1) and is also insignificant. When I further
control for the set of location and industry year FE in column (3), the coefficient on
the interaction term is of similar magnitude as in column (1) and becomes significant
at 5%. The results indicate that the change in equity policy has the effect of increasing
size of foreign firms by 18.7 percent on average. The positive effect on employment
is as predicted by Hypothesis 1.
Columns (3)-(6) display the results with the same specifications as in columns (1)-
in the period after the regulation change. Since the probability of being “too small” is 1− Pr(yi >
1) = 1/(1 + eZiβ1), which decreases in Zi if β1 > 0, this implies β13 > 0.
9 All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The results are from a sample dropping the
top and bottom 5% tails employment. I also drop publicly listed firms from the sample since they
are not subject to the same regulation change. The results are however insensitive to whether they
are included or not.
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(3) but in a sub-sample where I only include firms that are below the size threshold,
that is having less than 75 employees, in 2001. The results are qualitatively similar
as in the full sample. The coefficient on the interaction between foreign and after in
column (6) becomes more imprecisely estimated than in column (3) since the sample
size reduces. However, its magnitude also increases, which should be the case since
the policy should have an effect mostly on firms that were below the size threshold
in the initial period.
Before going into the regression results on Hypothesis 2, I first check for changes
in the proportions of firms with different size constraints in table 2.7. The results
suggest that the number of foreign firms reporting being smaller than optimal has
decreased in the second period but no similar changes are observed for other firms.
Next, table 2.8 presents formal results with marginal effect estimates for each outcome
of the dependent variable from equation (2.4). I report results from both the ordered
logit and the generalized ordered logit in the upper and lower panels respectively.10
The marginal effect estimates of Foreignit × after on the first outcome (i.e. on
the probability of firm size being “too small”) have the same expected sign in both
models and across different specifications. However, its estimated marginal effects
on the other two outcomes are different in signs, magnitude and significance level in
the ordered logit model compared to the generalized logit model. Results from Wald
tests for the restrictions on equality of coefficients in the ordered logit model, i.e.
βk = β for all k in equation (2.4), suggest that the ordered logit is too restrictive.
11
10 Note that unlike in the previous results from equation (2.3), my results in this table only
control for state instead of city FE. The reason is that the results do not converge in some of
the specifications. Results are otherwise insensitive to whether I control for city or state FE.
11 The Wald tests are performed on each variable in the model iteratively. The tests fail for a
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Therefore, my preferred model is the generalized model where the coefficients βk are
allowed to be different across k. In the discussion below, I focus on the results from
this model.
Column (1) reports the full sample results when I control for the full set of location
and industry-specific year FE.12 The results suggest that foreign firms are 7% less
likely to report being too small in the second round but the marginal effects are
imprecisely estimated. Next, columns (2) shows estimation results from the sub-
sample of firms whose size is below the 75 employee threshold in 2001. In this sample,
the estimated impact of being foreign owned after the policy change is statistically
as well as economically significant. Given the marginal effect estimate on “foreign,”
the results suggest that the policy has reduced the probability of foreign firms being
smaller than the optimal size by around 20%. Moreover, there is no evidence that
there is an impact on the probability of firms being “too large.” As a result, the
probability of firms being of optimal size also increases by about 20%.
Lastly, column (3) reports estimation results from the same specification as in
column (2) but in the sample where firms were already above the size threshold in
2001. Since the policy change should not have an effect on these firms, we would
expect the interaction between foreign ownership and the period dummy to have no
effect on firms’ size constraints. The results support this prediction.
In general, the results from the generalized ordered logit support the prediction
range of industry and location FE. A global LR test also rejects the null hypothesis that the slopes
are the same for all k at 0.01 level of significance (The test statistics for the samples in columns 1,
2, and 3 are chi2(39) = 106.49, 78.68 and 78.78 respectively). LR test results however do not take
into account clustering.
12 Results are also similar when I do not control for these FE. For brevity, I only include estimations
with the full set of FE in this table.
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in Hypothesis 2. Foreign firms not only are more likely to increase in size but they
are also significantly less likely to report as being constrained to be too small. On
the other hand, there is no evidence that the probability of firms being larger than
optimal has decreased. Taken together, the results suggest that the change in equity
policy has helped reduce the size distortion on foreign firms.
6.2 Robustness checks
The previous results are based on the definition of foreign firms as firms owned by
30 percent or more by foreigners. This is the standard definition of foreign ownership
in the literature. However, the rationale also rests in the fact the for firms that already
have less than 30 percent foreign ownership, i.e. they already have more than 70
percent domestic shareholders, restructuring is less likely to be an issue. Nevertheless,
I test for whether the results are different if I define all firms with any positive foreign
ownership as being “treated”. The resulted coefficient and marginal effect estimates
on the interaction term from equations (2.3) and (2.4) are given in column (1) of
table 2.9.These results correspond to the specifications with the full set of controls,
that is, they correspond to column (3) and (2) in tables 2.6 and 2.8 respectively. The
coefficient and marginal effect estimates on our variable of interest in both equations
(2.3) and (2.4) are statistically significant and of comparable magnitude as in the
estimations using the previous definition of foreign ownership.
Another concern with the previous results is that firms, in particular non-Bumiputera
domestic firms, might switch to acquire foreign ownership since only foreign-owned
firms are given the policy exemption. If there are other factors that affect employment
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at these firms differently then I might incorrectly attribute the effects of these changes
to the equity policy. To account for this possibility, ideally I would want to model
the decisions of firms to change ownership. However, I do not have a good instru-
ment that would affect firm’s ownership but not it’s employment. I choose a simpler
approach to check the robustness of my previous results. I define the “treated” group
as having foreign ownership in both rounds of the survey.
The results when 30 percent shares is used to define foreign ownership are reported
in column (2) of table 2.9. For the regression on log employment, the coefficient
estimate on foreign interacted with the period dummy is slightly smaller but still
significant. The ordered logit results on firm size constraint are almost unchanged.
The results suggest that firms that are at least 30% owned by foreigners are 18%
less likely to employment below optimal level and the marginal effects are precisely
estimated at 1% level. Next, column (3) shows the estimates when I define the
“treated” group as having any positive shares held by foreigners in both survey rounds.
The impact of foreign ownership on firm size constraint now becomes slightly smaller
but still significant at 1% level. In general, my results are robust to these alternative
definitions of foreign ownership.
Finally, I check for whether the results are sensitive to dropping firms which
switched industries between the first and second rounds of the survey. Since firms
might switch to another industry, for example to take advantage of industry-specific
policies, if foreign firms are more likely to switch then my results might be spurious.
The results in column (4) are essentially the same as in the full sample, suggesting
that this is not the case.
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6.3 Alternative explanations
The previous regressions have attempted to control for confounding factors that
could be correlated with foreign ownership and affect firm size. However, it is still
possible that there are other policies during the same period that target foreign firms
and affect their size differently over time. To check for this possibility, I examined
Country Reports by the The Economist Intelligent Unit in 2002-2006 for other policy
changes during this period.
One potential confounding policy change is the relaxation of rules on employ-
ing expatriates in manufacturing, also implemented in June 2003. Faced with la-
bor shortages in certain sectors, the government relaxed its stance on employing
highly skilled foreigners and importing foreign laborers (The Economist Intelligent
Unit 2004). While this policy could potentially impact all firms, foreign firms might
particularly benefit from it if they are more likely to employ skilled workers.
In table 2.10, I check whether there is evidence that foreign firms employ more
foreign workers after the policy change. The percentage of skilled foreign workers in
foreign firms actually decreases on average while increasing for domestically owned
firms. The simple DID calculation in means is -3.17%. Similarly, the DID in percent-
age unskilled foreign workers is also negative at -2.97%.
To formally check for the impact of the policy change with respect to expatriate
employment, I rerun the regressions in equations (2.3) and (2.4) controlling addi-
tionally for the firm’s percentage of skilled labor in 2001, interacted with the period
dummy. If foreign firms are more likely to benefit because they are more likely to need
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skilled foreign employees then controlling for this interaction term would separate out
the impact of this labor policy change from the equity policy. The results with all
location and industry FE are reported in table 2.11. Columns (1) and (2) show the
results on log employment and on firm size constraints respectively. While the coeffi-
cient estimates on the percentage skilled labor interaction suggests that there might
be a positive effect of the labor policy on firm employment, the coefficient estimate on
the interaction with foreign ownership are still significant and of similar magnitude
as before. The impact of foreign ownership on firm size constraints are also similar to
the results not controlling for skilled labor. Therefore, it is unlikely that my results
above are confounded with the change in expatriate employment rules.
7 Conclusion
By many standards, affirmative action in Malaysia could be considered a success
as it managed to lead to a rapid advancement of the Bumiputera, its designated
beneficiary group, in various areas such as education, public sector employment, and
asset ownership. In addition, Malaysia was able to avoid of the kind of widespread
violence associated with affirmative action found in India and elsewhere (Sowell 2004).
However, the myriad of government interventions under the NEP policies have also
been widely criticized for creating efficiencies and discouraging both Chinese and
foreign investments. Nevertheless, there has not been much formal empirical evidence
on the impact the NEP on businesses.
In this paper, I study one aspect of the pro-Bumiputera policies in the private
sector. More specifically, I examine the impact of a policy change which no longer
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requires foreign-owned manufacturers to set aside 30% of their equity for Malays
shareholders once their size passes a certain threshold. I develop a partial equilibrium
model to guide empirical predictions on the impact of this change on firm size in term
of employment and use data from the Malaysia Productivity and Investment Climate
Surveys in 2002 and 2007 to test these predictions. My model shows that there is
a range of productivity values where firms would find it too costly to operate above
the size threshold and therefore stay below their otherwise optimal size. Given data
limitations, I do not analyze the general equilibrium effects of the policy change.
Since labor demand changes can affect equilibrium wages, it is not clear how firm
size will change for all firms along the whole productivity distribution. In my model,
removing the restrictions for foreign firms means that they are less likely to be size
constrained. Consequently, the average size of foreign firms also increases accordingly.
DID regressions results find evidence supporting these predictions.
Despite the limitations mentioned above, my results indicate that the equity re-
striction has an effect as a size distortion on firms and relaxing it allows firms to
increase their employment to a more efficient size. In recent years, Malaysia has im-
plemented further similar reforms in the service sector as well as with publicly listed
companies. Evaluating the impacts of these reforms, particularly their consequences
on aggregate productivity, is an interesting and important area for future research.
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Tables




Panel obs No. of
1 2 (non-switchers) switchers
1. Food Processing 207 243 450 276 3
2. Textiles 30 40 70 28 3
3. Garments 102 90 192 94 4
4. Wood & Wood Products 4 28 32 2 4
5. Chemicals & Chemical Products 33 82 115 40 5
6. Rubber and Plastics 249 281 530 242 11
7. Machinery and Equipment 87 93 180 76 9
8. Office, Accounting & Comp. Machine 0 10 10 0 0
9. Electrical Machinery & Apparatus 0 27 27 0 3
10. Electronics (Equip. & Components) 75 84 159 64 6
11. Motor Vehicles and Parts 38 35 73 32 4
12. Furniture 77 102 179 64 6
Total 902 1,115 2,017 918 58
Tab. 2.2: Number of firms by age group
Number of firms in round
Total
% firms in round
Age group 1 2 1 2
1 (entering) 2 2 4 0.22 0.18
2 to 5 81 38 119 8.97 3.45
6 to 10 214 154 368 23.70 13.96
10+ 605 907 1,512 67.00 82.23
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Tab. 2.3: Firm ownership by round
Round 1 2 Total
Percentage shares held by foreigners 23.97 22.99 23.43
Percentage shares held by Bumiputera 11.45 10.58 10.96
Percentage shares held by Chinese 57.76 59.60 58.80
Percentage shares held by other domestic owners 6.07 6.80 6.48
Tab. 2.4: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean S.d Min Max
Foreign (foreign shares ≥ 30%) 2017 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Age 2003 17.73 11.27 1.00 215.00
Number of permanent workers 2002 180.67 428.90 2.00 6709.00
% firms with ≥ 75 workers 2002 41.76 49.33 0.00 100.00
Equity 1938 9215.80 66695.15 -149.61 2103755.00
% firms with equity ≥ 2.5 mil RM 1938 31.32 46.39 0.00 100.00
% firms above emp/equity threshold 1964 50.51 50.01 0.00 100.00
Total assets 1919 32922.76 94217.77 11.78 1158128.00
% of total export sales 1968 35.89 40.37 0.00 100.00
Sales 1961 51746.53 156822.30 4.71 1733783.00
Monetary values are in thd RM and deflated using PPI index (2000 as base).
The percentage of firms above equity threshold are calculated using nominal equity
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Tab. 2.5: Summary statistics for treated and control groups
Obs Mean
Difference p-val
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
BEFORE
Age 644 258 17.404 15.616 -1.787 0.044
Number of permanent workers 640 257 118.517 292.432 173.915 0.000
% firms with more than 75 workers 640 257 31.563 63.813 32.251 0.000
Equity 602 240 8681.205 13390.956 4709.751 0.445
% firms with equity above 2.5 mil RM 602 240 20.100 46.667 26.567 0.000
% firms above emp OR equity threshold 612 248 39.052 75.000 35.948 0.000
Total assets 595 234 21680.810 58925.082 37244.272 0.000
% of total export sales 616 252 25.995 63.044 37.049 0.000
Sales 622 248 25528.236 88577.441 63049.205 0.000
AFTER
Age 811 290 19.518 18.459 -1.059 0.134
Number of permanent workers 809 296 113.244 402.301 289.057 0.000
% firms with more than 75 workers 809 296 33.869 66.216 32.347 0.000
Equity 800 296 6892.285 13197.573 6305.288 0.084
% firms with equity above 2.5 mil RM 800 296 23.500 62.838 39.338 0.000
% firms above emp OR equity threshold 804 300 40.920 79.333 38.413 0.000
Total assets 796 294 18884.228 72987.662 54103.434 0.000
% of total export sales 805 295 26.831 58.105 31.274 0.000
Sales 802 289 36621.611 118542.003 81920.391 0.000
91
Tab. 2.6: Impact on firm size
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(employment) Full sample Size in 2001 < 75
age 0.00357 -0.00639**
(0.00266) (0.00325)
Foreign 0.381*** -0.178 -0.268** 0.0785 -0.242** -0.342***
(0.0929) (0.119) (0.120) (0.0889) (0.121) (0.122)
after 0.0965*** 0.158***
(0.0302) (0.0329)
Foreign × after 0.163 0.0351 0.187** 0.0456 0.154 0.271*
(0.116) (0.0691) (0.0857) (0.157) (0.113) (0.138)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
City year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.252*** 4.047*** 4.443*** 3.126*** 3.337*** 2.764***
(0.214) (0.0317) (0.433) (0.154) (0.0224) (0.237)
Observations 1672 836 836 713 500 500
R-squared 0.273 0.046 0.380 0.320 0.142 0.573
Number of firms 455 455 271 271
Foreign is a dummy variable denoting 30% or more foreign ownership
Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Tab. 2.7: Reported size constraints in the panel sample
Round
Total
Size constraint 1 2
Foreign owned firms
Too small 46 30 76
Optimal 81 82 163
Too large 42 47 89
All firms
Too small 133 112 245
Optimal 228 254 482
Too large 127 122 249
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Tab. 2.8: Size constraint probabilities (marginal effects reported)
(1) (2) (3)
Sample: All firms Size in 2001 < 75 Size in 2001 >75
Dependent variable: size Too small Optimal Too large Too small Optimal Too large Too small Optimal Too large
Ordered logit model
age 0.0020** -0.000049 -0.0020** 0.00098 -0.000083 -0.00089 0.0026** 0.000044 -0.0027**
(0.00093) (0.000099) (0.00090) (0.0015) (0.00015) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.00017) (0.0013)
Foreign 0.027 -0.0015 -0.025 0.018 -0.0020 -0.016 0.036 -0.00053 -0.035
(0.032) (0.0032) (0.029) (0.053) (0.0077) (0.045) (0.045) (0.0031) (0.042)
Foreign × after -0.045 -0.0033 0.049 -0.088 -0.015 0.10 -0.041 -0.0038 0.044
(0.036) (0.0067) (0.042) (0.056) (0.028) (0.083) (0.047) (0.0085) (0.055)
State year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1884 1884 1884 787 787 787 1107 1107 1107
Generalized ordered logit model
age 0.0018 0.00020 -0.0020** 0.0013 -0.00086 -0.00047 0.0021 0.00083 -0.0029**
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.00091) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.00099) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0012)
Foreign 0.036 -0.021 -0.014 0.042 -0.045 0.0035 0.045 -0.025 -0.020
(0.036) (0.040) (0.035) (0.061) (0.058) (0.033) (0.049) (0.056) (0.048)
Foreign × after -0.070* 0.047 0.023 -0.21*** 0.23*** -0.022 -0.044 0.0081 0.036
(0.041) (0.053) (0.049) (0.045) (0.060) (0.049) (0.053) (0.067) (0.062)
State year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1884 1884 1884 787 787 787 1107 1107 1107
Dependent variable = (1, 2, 3) if firms’ self reported size is too small, optimal and too large.
The generalized ordered logit model is estimated using the gologit2 command in Stata (Williams 2006).
Marginal effects reported. Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Tab. 2.9: Robustness checks
Alternative definitions of foreign Same industry
Eqn Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
(2.3) ln(employment) 0.198** 0.149* 0.158** 0.176**
(0.0829) (0.0833) (0.0780) (0.0874)
Sample size 846 846 846 788
(2.4) Size too small -0.175*** -0.176*** -0.158*** -0.217***
(0.0528) (0.0655) (0.0582) (0.0490)
Size optimal 0.219*** 0.195** 0.151* 0.247***
(0.0579) (0.0804) (0.0782) (0.0630)
Size too large -0.0439 -0.0187 0.00689 -0.0304
Sample size 802 802 802 763
Eqn (2.3): coefficient estimates on (foreign×after), from the spec in column (3) of Table 2.6
Eqn (2.4): Marginal effects on (foreign×after), from the spec in column (2) of Tables 2.8
Column (1): foreign is defined as having positive shares by foreigners
Column (2): foreign is defined as having 30 or more shares by foreigners both 2001 & 2006
Column (3): foreign is defined as having positive shares by foreigners in both 2001 & 2006
Column (4): firms that switched industries between 2 rounds are dropped from the sample
Tab. 2.10: Percentage of permanent workers of foreign nationals
Before After
Skilled Domestic 10.94 12.23
Foreign 10.61 8.73
DID -3.17




Tab. 2.11: Alternative explanations
(1) (2)
ln(emp) Firm size
Dependent variable Too small Optimal Too large
age 0.00154 -0.00122 -0.000319
(0.00190) (0.00184) (0.000966)
Foreign -0.249** 0.0427 -0.0468 0.00416
(0.119) (0.0614) (0.0586) (0.0322)
Foreign× after 0.189** -0.199*** 0.214*** -0.0155
(0.0851) (0.0480) (0.0629) (0.0509)
% skilled labor in 2001×after 0.207* -0.145 0.290*** -0.145***




Industry year FE Yes
City year FE Yes
Industry year FE Yes
State year FE Yes
Observations 836 787 787 787
R-squared 0.388
Number of firms 455
Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Column (1): linear regression on log employment with firm FE
Column (2): generalized ordered logit regression, mar. eff. reported, sample: size in 2001 < 75
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Chapter 3. Labor Standards, Market Power and the Terms of
Trade Incentive: An Empirical Analysis
1 Introduction
Trade negotiators have long demanded GATT/WTO agreements to incorporate
domestic policies such as labor standards in the so-called “social clauses”. One of the
major arguments put forward as a justification for the international harmonization
of standards is the well worn the-race-to-the-bottom hypothesis. There are several
explanations for this hypothesis. The first line of argument aims at developing coun-
tries. It posits that lax labor standards give these countries an unfair advantage in
exports. This in turn exerts a downward pressure on standards in rich countries at
the fear of loss in competitiveness. However, this concern is not supported by trade
economists, who argue that differences are the source of gains from trade. Thus if
some countries are different in their preferences about labor standards, it is a reason
against, not for harmonization. Empirical work also fails to find conclusive evidence
about the impact of labor standards on export performance and competitive advan-
tage. Labor standards after all have two opposite effects on competitiveness. One is
on labor cost and the other is on productivity. Accounting for productivity, Rodrik
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(1996) finds a range of measures of labor standards to still have significant effect
on labor cost but they are not important determinants of comparative advantage in
labor intensive exports. On the contrary, Mah (1997) finds the rights to nondiscrim-
ination and freedom of association to be strongly negatively correlated with export
performance for developing countries.
A more convincing argument concerns the distributional consequences of standard
setting. Brown et al. (1996) explain that for a small country, the costs of imposing
a labor standard on an import-competing sector would be borne solely by domestic
producers if the country acts unilaterally. But if all countries coordinate then the
world price rises and part of the costs is shifted to consumers. The country is actually
worse off because of the price increase but it can still be politically optimal when the
government gives a higher weight on producers than on consumers.
These concerns have motivated a sizable empirical literature on whether trade
actually affects labor standards. These studies often rely on cross-country data.
Trade or export openness, defined as (Import + Export)/GDP or Export/GDP, is
often used as the independent variable to estimate the impact of exposure to trade
on labor standards. Evidence of causal relationships is rare because most studies
neglect the problem of reverse causality between trade and standard as well as the
unobserved characteristics that can affect both variables. Among the few recent
studies that address this issue, the evidence is mixed. For example, Edmonds &
Pavcnik (2006) fail to find any significant effect of openness on child labor while
Neumayer & De Soysa (2006) suggest that openness significantly improves the rights
to Free Association and Collective Bargaining (FACB). Nonetheless, there is generally
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no evidence for the negative impact of trade openness on labor standards.
In this paper, I present a perspective different from this dominant focus in the
current literature. I argue that by focusing on openness, previous studies have failed
to explore another channel through which trade could affect labor standards. My
reasoning stems from a less widely recognized explanation of the-race-to-the-bottom
possibility. It concerns large importers that possess some market power. Essentially,
it is a second-best argument that if countries cannot set import tariffs freely, lower
labor standards could work as a substitute to gain terms of trade advantages or
to achieve domestic political objectives. Unlike the ambiguous predictions of the
impact of openness on standards, both political economy and terms of trade theories
predict that the larger the size of the importer, the larger its incentive to lower labor
standards.
It is this prediction that the paper aims to test. To my knowledge, the only other
study that investigates a similar hypothesis is Ederington & Minier (2003), which
concerns environmental standard stringency in different US manufacturing sectors.
This paper differs from their study in three aspects. Firstly, my estimation framework
is in a cross-country rather than industry wise setting. Secondly, I consider a different
measure of market power. And finally, to address endogeneity problems, Ederington &
Minier (2003) use simultaneous equations estimation while I rely on the Instrumental
Variables method.
My results offer some first evidence, albeit weak that market shares in import
affect countries’ labor standards adversely and the effect is stronger among GATT
members than among non-member countries.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 provides theoretical dis-
cussions for the links between a country’s terms of trade and its domestic policies,
including labor standard policies and explains the reasoning of the paper’s central
hypothesis. Section 3 describes the estimation strategy and data. Section 4 presents
estimation results and section 5 concludes.
2 Theory
The central hypothesis of this paper is founded on the terms of trade theory of
protection. The intuition is simple. Analogous to the case of a monopoly whereby
restricting output can raise prices, a large enough country could induce foreign ex-
porters to lower their export prices by imposing tariffs and thereby reducing its import
demand. It is beneficial for the country to impose a “small” tariff on its imports as
long as the gains from this terms of trade effect are more than offset the losses due
to its market distortion effect. All else equal, the extent to which the country can
gain from its tariff increases with its ability to influence its terms of trade by reducing
import demand. If the government’s objective is to choose tariff levels to maximize
national income, it is shown that the optimal tariff is equal to the inverse export
supply elasticity. This relationship holds in a two good- two factor setting as well as
a many good- many country and intra-industry trade setting (see for example, Broda
et al. (2008) for theoretical derivations).
A direct application of this theory is Bagwell & Staiger (1999) theory of GATT
formation. They argue that countries seek multilateral agreements to avoid the ineffi-
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ciency caused by unilateral tariff setting1 and many GATT’s features can be explained
as to implement efficient agreements. The optimal tariff argument has sometimes been
seen as a theoretical derivation without much applicability. For example, Krugman
(1997, p113) asserts that it “plays almost no role in real world dispute over trade
policy” while Rose (2004) finds no evidence that the WTO has any effects on trade
liberalization. However, recent empirical studies show that the optimal tariff motive
might actually play a role in trade policies. Bagwell & Staiger (2006) provide evi-
dence that WTO accession after the Uruguay round leads to greater tariff reductions
in products with higher import volumes. Broda et al. (2008) find a typical non-
WTO member in their sample sets tariffs 9% higher in goods with high market power
relative to those with low market power. A natural question that follows is what if
a country is a GATT/WTO member? Would a country being constrained in tariff
setting use other policies such as environmental or labor regulations that have similar
effects on import demand to regain some of its terms of trade advantages?
Second-best models offer an answer to this question. In theory, domestic policies
that affect domestic supply/demand in an open economy are also trade distorting.
Copeland (1991) argues that when there are limits to the feasibility of cooperation in
trade negotiations, governments have incentives to substitute negotiable barriers such
as tariffs towards other nonnegotiable means of protection. Even though these other
instruments are more costly than direct protection, it is still optimal to negotiate
then “cheat” because at some point, the benefits from reduced protection outweigh
1 Intuitively, unilateral optimal tariff setting is inefficient because gains from terms of trade
improvement are essentially international cost shifting. As part of the cost of tariff distortion is
borne by foreign exporters in the form of price reductions, countries would set their tariffs higher
than the globally optimal level (Bagwell & Staiger 2006).
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the costs of using less efficient instruments.
More specific explanations of how domestic regulations work as instruments for
trade policies can be found in Krutilla (1991). He derives the optimal Pigouvian
taxes associated with negative environmental externalities for a large open economy.
In the case of negative production externality, the optimal tax equals the standard
Pigouvian tax plus terms reflecting the terms of trade impact of taxation and tariff
revenue collection. The first-best solution involves a combination of the standard
Pigouvian tax and the standard optimal tariff, which varies inversely with export
supply elasticity. However, if an importer is constrained to set tariff lower than the
optimal level, the terms of trade effect (negative) dominates the tariff revenue effect
(positive) and the optimal environmental tax is lower than the standard Pigouvian
tax. Intuitively, setting lower tax increases the country’s excess supply and decreases
its import volume. The loss from setting lower tax is then counterbalanced by the
gain from the decrease in the volume and cost of imports.
If the standard optimal tariff is negatively related to the country’s export supply
elasticity and second-best environmental tax is set to regain some terms of trade
advantages, it follows that the discrepancy between the optimal taxes in the first-
best and second-best solutions is also negatively related to the country’s export supply
elasticity. In other words, the optimal Pigouvian tax for an importer decreases with
its market power. As market power is positively related to market share, the optimal
tax should also decrease with market share. Empirical evidence by Ederington &
Minier (2003) supports this prediction. By examining US data on manufacturing
industries, they find that the stringency of environmental policy has a positive impact
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on net import levels while net import levels have a negative impact on environmental
stringency.
The case of labor standards is completely analogous to imposing environmental
taxes to correct negative production externalities. Bagwell & Staiger (2001) prove
theoretically that lowering labor standards is a policy substitute for import tariffs. In-
tuitively, it reduces labor cost for import competing producers. Domestic production
expands while import demand decreases as a consequence. If the country has market
power, this demand reduction will lead to a decrease in world prices. In summary,
theory predicts a possibility for countries to use labor standards as a second means
of protection. As market power rises with market share, we can expect a negative
relationship between market shares in imports and labor standards across countries.2
However, if big importers seek to lower their labor and environmental standards to
improve their terms of trade, we can expect big exporters to do just the opposite. For
example, Brown et al. (1996) show in a 2x2 model that if labor standards are labor
using then imposing labor standard is equivalent to contracting labor supply. Conse-
quently, world wages and the price of the labor intensive exports increase. Therefore,
exporters of labor intensive goods, as a group have an incentive to overprotect labor.
Chau & Kanbur (2006) draws a similar conclusion in a model with two big exporters
and a competitive fringe. The competitive fringe will choose low standards while big
exporters take into account the terms of trade effects and raise their standards to
2 Bagwell & Staiger (2006) offer a decomposition of the income effect when a country imposes
tariffs on imports. From this decomposition, it is shown explicitly that the unilateral optimal tariff
level is further away from the efficient level, the larger the country’s import volume. If the same
argument is applied to the second-best model, the optimal level of domestic policy distortion should
vary positively with import volumes.
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higher than the efficient level: the bigger the exporter, the higher its ability to alter
terms of trade and hence bigger incentive to raise standards. Then if a country has
market power in both import and export markets, does the terms of trade motive
in the export market eliminate the other motive in the import market? Broda et
al. (2008) summarize theoretical studies which show that it is not the case. Market
power in exports might create another motive for the use of import tariffs or domestic
policies but all else equal, countries with bigger market power in imports still have a
bigger incentive to impose higher tariffs or setting lower standards. In addition, the
terms of trade incentive in exports might not be strong in reality because unlike tar-
iffs, countries are less likely to be constrained in imposing export taxes. The WTO,
for example, does not regulate export taxes. For these reasons, it seems more likely
for domestic policies to play a role in influencing terms of trade in import sectors
rather than in export sectors.
Note that protection can also be explained by political economy theory and the
predictions still hold in the same direction. For example, Grossman & Helpman
(1995) incorporate the notion of political contribution to show that optimal tariff
is still positively correlated to the country’s inverse export supply elasticity even if
the government places no weight on social welfare. Bagwell & Staiger (2001, 2006)
models are also robust to political economy considerations.
Finally, as Krugman (1997, p114) puts it, free trade negotiations “are a game
scored according to mercantilist rules, in which an increase in exports – no matter
how expensive to produce in terms of other opportunities foregone – is a victory, and
an increase in imports – no matter how many resources it releases for other uses – is
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a defeat”. From this point of view, the argument to use domestic policies to influence
terms of trade for import seems even more convincing than in the case for exports.
3 Estimation framework
Ideally, the hypothesis that market power in imports affects labor standards can be
tested in a structural model relating export supply elasticities and industry-specific
labor standards. However, the lack of industry-specific labor standard data does not
allow for this approach. The empirical strategy of this paper is thus to find whether
cross-country evidence supports the hypothesis of a negative relationship between
labor standards and importer sizes. As a measure for the size of the importing
country, I use its market share in world import of labor intensive goods.3 Only labor
intensive goods is included because if a big country imports non-labor intensive goods,
it is likely to export labor intensive goods therefore hurting itself by reducing labor
standards. Thus, market share of total import would not be a good measure of how
the terms of trade incentive affects country’s labor standard choice.
3 The only other cross-country study that concerns the impact of market power on labor standards
(child labor) is Shelburne (2001) where country’s GNP is used as a measure of its economic to capture
the notion of market power. However, market share is a more direct and thus a better indicator of
a country’s market power than national income even if the category of goods is broad. Bagwell &
Staiger (2006) find that export supply elasticities have a much stronger (positive) correlation with
market shares in imports than with GDP.
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3.1 Estimated equations




• LSi is country i ’s labor standard
• Msharei is country i’ s share of world import in labor-intensive goods
• Esharei is country i’ s share of world export in labor-intensive goods
• incomei is the real GDP per capita for country i
• Xi is a vector of other country characteristics that affect labor standards and
are potentially correlated to Msharei and Esharei
• εi is the error term
• the variables are in natural log form to avoid the impact of outliers
Previous work has considered either net imports or import levels in examining the
relationship between market shares and industry protection (Ederington & Minier
2003, Trefler 1993). However, both approaches have important caveats in this study’s
setting. Using net imports rather than imports ignores the fact that the relation-
ship between market power in import and net import levels are less straightforward.
Countries with similar net import levels but different import levels could have com-
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pletely different market power.4 Using only import level is also problematic since
imports and exports are often highly correlated. Estimated coefficient on import
alone could therefore be biased if governments actually use labor standards to affect
exports. Even if it is not the case, bigger export shares could still counteract gov-
ernments’ incentive to lower standards because it could harm their export terms of
trade. Therefore, I include both import and export levels, normalized by the world
trade value to account for these issues. Nevertheless, as argued earlier, countries are
less likely to be constrained in setting export taxes. The main coefficient of interest
thus remains β1.
If labor standard is a normal good, increases in income would improve labor stan-
dards. Since trade is likely to have an impact on income as the trade & growth
literature indicates, excluding income would bias the coefficients on trade variables. I
control for this by using both the natural log of GDP per capita and its squared values
to avoid bias estimates if labor standards vary nonlinearly with income. Including
both income terms also yields a better modeling fit as the results later reveal.
This paper hypothesizes that when countries are constrained by multilateral trade
agreements in their ability to set optimal tariffs, domestic policies are used as a sec-
ondary means of protection. It follows that the main countries of interest would
be members of GATT/WTO. Certainly, the argument does not exclude other coun-
tries from using this means since they could also be constrained by other regional
or bilateral agreements. However, the smaller coverage of those agreements implies
4 The correlation coefficients between net imports and import shares vary from 0.5 to 0.6 in
different samples in this study.
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market shares would affect GATT/WTO members more than non-member countries.
I examine this prediction in several ways.
Firstly, equation (3.1) is also estimated with GATT/WTO members only to com-
pare the estimated β1 in two samples. Secondly, I consider the impact of a dummy
variable on GATT/WTO membership denoted by Di and its interactions with import
and export shares in the following specifications:
LSi =β0 + β1ln(Msharei) + β2ln(Esharei) + β3ln(incomei) + β4(ln(incomei))
2
+ γ1Di + δXi + εi
(3.2)
LSi =β0 + β1ln(Msharei) + β2ln(Esharei) + β3ln(incomei) + β4(ln(incomei))
2
+ γ1Di + γ2Di × ln(Msharei) + γ3Di × ln(Esharei) + δXi + εi
(3.3)
Theory also suggests a more direct relationship between tariffs and labor standards:
conditional on market power in import, higher tariffs will be associated with lower
labor standards. I use average duty as a proxy for tariffs and estimate equations (3.2)
and (3.3) where Di is replaced by average duty.
3.2 Instrumental Variables estimation
Import shares and export shares are endogenous. If big importing countries lower
labor standards to improve their terms of trade, that is because lower standards in-
duce lower import levels. The converse is true for exports. Other arguments for the
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negative impact of standards on exports include its negative effect on capital forma-
tion & Foreign Direct Investment. Some empirical studies find evidence supporting
this prediction. For example, Kucera (2006) finds labor standards to have a negative
impact on labor intensive exports. In addition, if there are unobserved country char-
acteristics that affect both trade and labor standards then OLS estimations would
suffer from omission bias.
To address the problem of endogeneity, I follow the trade and growth literature
to instrument for trade based on geography with the assumption that geography
does not affect labor standards through channels other than trade (Frankel & Romer
1999, Frankel & Rose 2005, Edmonds & Pavcnik 2006). But instead of using trade
openness (Import + Export/GDP) as the dependent variable, I regress the natural
log of bilateral export and import shares on geography. More specifically, the natural
log of import (export) of country i from (to) country j, divided by world import
value, is regressed on the log of distance between two countries, the log of population
of country j,5 the log of the product of the two countries’ areas 6 and indicators for
whether the countries share a common language, common border and are landlocked.7
The bilateral import equation is:
ln(importij/world import) = α0 + α1ln(distanceij) + α2ln(populationj) + α3commlangij
+ α4commborderij + α5ln(areai × areaj) + α6landlockedij + ηij
(3.4)
5 The standard gravity also considers population of country i but I follow Frankel & Rose (2005)
to use only country j ’s population. Doing this has the advantage that if a country’s population
affects labor standards independently, the exclusion restrictions of the instruments are still satisfied.
6 to capture the notion that country i and country j ’s areas should affect trade equivalently
7 Similarly, to capture that whether country i or j is landlocked has the same effect on trade: 0-
both are not landlocked, 1- one country is landlocked and 2- both are landlocked
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The exponential of the fitted values are then summed up across trading partners
to construct the values of total import and export shares of a country. To avoid
outlier problems, I take the natural log of these constructed values again to use
as an instrument for the log of import shares. R2 of these two gravity equations
are not as high as in the standard gravity model result but actual and constructed
log of import/export shares from the model are highly correlated (the correlation
coefficients between the constructed and actual import and export shares are 0.79
and 0.87 respectively). Since import and export shares are highly correlated after
being instrumented by the same variables in the gravity model, using both of them in
one equation causes collinearity problems. I use the natural log of the average import
and export shares of other countries in the sample as two other instruments that
could potentially drive import and export shares of a country in opposite directions.
A concern with our constructed instruments is if geography affects labor standard
outcomes independently then the exclusion restriction of the IV estimation is violated.
To control for this possibility, I consider a range of variables that could affect labor
standards and are potentially correlated to a country’s geographical characteristics.
Edmonds & Pavcnik (2006) identify several such factors. Firstly, the growth literature
suggests that a country’s geography, including latitude, could be correlated to its
quality of institutions. Democracy, as a dimension of quality of institutions, has been
identified as an important determinant of labor standards in previous empirical studies
such as Rodrik (1999). Thus, latitude and a measure of democracy8 are included in
8 I use the polity variable from the Polity IV project. Other similar measures exist such as the
Freedom House index of civil right liberties and political freedom. However, these indices are highly
correlated with income so they cause collinearity problems in my regressions.
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all of the above specifications. Secondly, countries in different regions of the world
have different historical and cultural characteristics that might influence their labor
standard policies. These unobserved characteristics are potentially correlated with
geography. I control for this possibility by including dummy variables to indicate
whether a country belongs to East Asia & Pacific, South Asia, Eastern Europe &
Central Asia, Middle East & North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America &
Caribbean, North America and Western Europe. Other controlled variables are also
included as a robustness check and are discussed in the results section in more details.
Income per capita also suffers the same problems of reverse causality and unob-
served heterogeneity. To instrument for income and its non-linear term, I use the
two-step IV method (Wooldridge 2002). First, the gravity model is used to construct
predicted values for trade openness. The procedure is the same as in Frankel & Rose
(2005) and Edmonds & Pavcnik (2006). In the next step, log of per capita income is
regressed on the constructed trade openness, lagged capital per worker in natural log
and Xi. The predicted values and its squares are used as instruments for ln(income)
and (ln(income))2 in the final regression. However, it is likely that lagged capital per
worker is not truly exogenous due to unobserved heterogeneity. As noted by Edmonds
& Pavcnik (2004), it is very difficult to find strictly exogenous instruments for income
in the cross country context. Therefore, the IV estimation only aims to minimize bias
and assess its extent by comparing IV results against OLS results.
Another endogenous variable is GATT/WTO membership - Di - because of the
selection bias problem. Countries that choose to join GATT/WTO could have un-
observed characteristics that make them differ systematically from other countries.
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In addition, to gain accession, countries are often required to implement a range of
policy reforms that could include some provisions for labor policies. To avoid the
selection bias issue, a linear probability equation is included to instrument for Di.
The instrument used is the average membership of other countries in the region that
a country belongs to, in order to take advantage of the spatial correlation in member-
ship. Intuitively, this instrument takes into account the relationships among countries
in the same region. Those countries often have closer links among each other, includ-
ing trade. Thus if more countries in the region join GATT/WTO, the non-member
countries could have more incentives to join as the previously trade links in the re-
gion are now diverted to outside countries. Obviously, IV estimation cannot resolve
the endogeneity problem completely but can only avoid selection bias. However, if
GATT/WTO accession has any implications for labor standards, it is likely to be of
the positive direction. If this paper still finds the negative impact of import shares on
standards for GATT/WTO members, it is possible to suggest that the impact of the
terms of trade motive on standards is as predicted and it is stronger than the impact
of accession requirements.
The same argument goes for average duty. Unobservable country characteristics
that affect both labor standards and trade policies can result in endogeneity problems.
However, it is unclear in which direction the results would be biased. Therefore,
I choose to treat average duty as exogenous, mainly to compare the results when
GATT/WTO membership is controlled for.
It is harder to find instruments for the interaction terms in equation (3.3) since
both variables in each term are potentially endogenous. When both are treated
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as endogenous, the instruments become so weak that none of the variable in the
final stage equation is significant. Consequently, Di is treated as exogenous in this
specification. The interaction terms are instrumented by the interactions of Di with
the excluded instruments for import and export shares mentioned above.9 Both the
IV estimations for (3.2) & (3.3) again can be viewed as a robustness check to assess
the extent of OLS bias rather than a complete solution for endogeneity.
Another concern with GATT/WTO membership is how to define Di because the
eventual purpose of Di is not to say if a country is a member but to capture whether
the country is constrained in its ability to set tariffs. Membership does not perfectly
reflect this constraint. Piermartini & Teh (2005) argue that before the creation of
the WTO in 1995, GATT did not require significant reductions in trade barriers for
developing countries acceding. Moreover, transition periods for tariff reductions are
often allowed. On the other hand, many countries liberalize beforehand to facilitate
accession. If Diis simply defined as one if a country is a member at the time con-
sidered, the results could be misleading but the direction of bias is ambiguous. The
problem is further complicated by the fact that the data in this study are averaged
over the 1993-1997 period (as explained in the next section). Some arbitrary choices
are considered but they produce very similar results. Section 4 presents the results
with a rather “balanced” definition of membership: Di = 1 if the country is a GATT
member (if it joined before 1995).
9 In notations, if X is endogenous and Z & W are excluded instruments for X: the excluded
instrument set for (X; X*D) is (Z;W; Z*D;W*D)
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3.3 Data
The dependent variable is a measure of the Freedom of Association and Collective
Bargaining (FACB), one of the four core labor standards. It is an index of trade
union rights in the mid 90s (1993-1997) constructed by Kucera (2004) based on vi-
olations of FACB rights recorded in the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions’ Annual Survey of Violations of Trade union Rights, the US State Depart-
ment’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and the ILO’s Reports of the
Committee on Freedom of Association. The resulting score is rescaled to run from 0
to 10 with 10 being the “least violations observed” and 0 being the “most violations
observed” or when unionization is prohibited. Both the unweighted and weighted
versions of the variable are used in this study. However, only the results using the
weighted index are reported since they produce similar estimates but the weighted
index yields more conservative results.
The FACB index is suitable for the purpose of this study for a number of reasons.
Firstly, its evaluation criteria come mostly from observations in the formal manufac-
turing sector which is relevant as import/export sectors. Secondly, FACB rights are
a process-related standard which is more likely to subject to government’s determi-
nation than other outcome standards such as actual wages or hours of work. It is
however an index measuring outcomes at the same time. Therefore it is less subject
to criticisms about using the number of ILO convention ratifications or country writ-
ten laws which do not always measure true labor standard outcomes. Several other
measures related to FACB rights also exist such as the Freedom House index of civil
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right liberties and the OECD index of trade union rights but to date this is the richest
variable and covers a wide range of countries. It is also technically convenient since
it is a continuous variable and the problem of zero observations could be resolved by
Tobit estimation.
Nevertheless, the FACB index also has several shortcomings. It is subject to bias
because countries are different in their reporting levels. Latin American trade unions,
for example are more likely to file complaints with the ILO Committee on Freedom
of Association. This bias could be addressed by including regional dummies (Kucera
2004, p9). However, a more important concern is the extent to which FACB rights
capture production cost. Kucera (2004) asserts that although FACB rights do not
impose an immediate labor cost, stronger FACB rights are expected to be associated
with higher cost at least due to the impact of unionization. Empirical studies such
as Rodrik (1996, 1999) find that after accounting for productivity; labor standard
measured in terms of democracy (the FH civil right liberties index, which is a part of
the FACB index) still has a large and statistically significant effect on labor cost. Yet,
it is worth keeping in mind that this cannot ensure that the labor cost effect is strong
enough for the government to consider FACB policies as an alternative protection
means. As summed up by Brown (2001), labor standards are at most a secondary
determinant of wages in low income countries.
Bilateral trade data come primarily from the NBER data on World Trade Flows
(Feenstra 2000). However, because trade values of transition countries are not re-
ported separately in this dataset, data for transition countries from Feenstra et al.
(2005) is combined to obtain as many countries that match with the countries reported
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in the FACB data as possible. Following Edmonds & Pavcnik (2006), I consider items
from the BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis) manufacturing industry categories 5
- Apparel and other textiles products, 6 – Leather and Leather products & 34 –
other manufacturing and the corresponding SITC rv.2 categories as labor-intensive
manufacturing goods. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006) also treat category 4 – Food
and kindred products as labor intensive but it is more controversial as food process-
ing is considered capital intensive in Kucera (2006). Import and export values10 in
these categories are averaged over 1993-1997 for each country. The sums of imports
and exports are then divided by total world imports across three BEA categories to
calculate the market share of labor intensive goods.
Data sources for other variables can be found in the Appendix A. Appendix B lists
the countries in the sample with their weighted FACB scores, log of export shares
and log of import shares in ascending order.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Main results
Table 3.1 reports OLS results. The results are relatively consistent with the the-
oretical predictions. Import shares have a negative and significant impact on FACB
rights. The coefficients on export shares are sometime negative but very close to zero
and insignificant except for specification (3). GATT membership and average duty
also have a negative effect on labor standards even though they are not significant.
10 Import and export volumes are reported in Feenstra et al. (2005) but not completed. Feenstra
(2000) only reports value data. Therefore the option of using trade volumes is excluded.
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The estimated effects of income are on the other hand, unexpected. Neumayer &
De Soysa (2006) argue that income should not affect a process-related standard such
as FACB rights and find evidence supporting this argument. Similarly, Botero et al.
(2004) find that income does not have a significant impact on labor union power. But
both income and income squared are highly significant in my results. The signs are
also hard to interpret. They seem to suggest a U-shaped relationship between FACB
rights and income: FACB rights worsen with the initial income increases and improve
at later stages of development.
Other covariates include Polity (measuring democracy) and latitude. Democracy
has a positive and significant effect, which is consistent with findings from previ-
ous studies. Countries in higher latitude appear to have better FACB rights.11 The
specifications in Table1 exclude regional indicators. I choose to report the more parsi-
monious models because when these variables are included, OLS results stay relatively
constant. Standard errors of all coefficients increase considerably but magnitudes of
the coefficient estimates are similar, suggesting that excluding regional indicators do
not bias results.
OLS results are potentially biased. Table 3.2 reports results for the same specifi-
cations in Table 3.1 when import and export shares are instrumented. The equations
are estimated by LIML to make use of the test for weak instruments.
When trade shares are instrumented, the coefficients on import shares (β1) still
11 The estimated effect of latitude is rather different from past studies. When I include latitude
as the distance from the equator as in Frankel & Romer (1999) and Edmonds & Pavcnik (2006),
standard errors for all coefficients are very large. But if the “true” latitude is included, the modeling
fit improves significantly. The same applies for richer models presented below. This observation
suggests a systematic difference between countries in the north and in the south.
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have expected sign but become insignificant. OLS estimations treat the market share
variables as exogenous but if lowering labor standards reduces import then estimates
of β1 will be biased upwards. However, the IV point estimates are in general compa-
rable with OLS estimates and their differences are not statistically significant.
The instruments perform reasonably well except for specification (3). All speci-
fications pass the tests of underidentification and the overidentification test at 1%
level. The Shea partial R2 are high in general. I also use the minimum eigenvalue
statistics to test for the presence of weak instruments. Except for specification (3),
the specifications pass the test of weak instruments at 10% or 15% level (IV bias
within 10% or 15% of OLS bias, all tests are performed at 5% level of significance). It
is also interesting to look at the point estimates in specification (3). In both OLS and
IV results, the point estimates are significantly different from other specifications.
Since instruments for trade shares perform poorly in this equation and import shares
become more positive while export shares become more negative, it seems to suggest
that in fact they have the opposite signs, which is indicated by other specifications.
As we argue earlier, income, GATT/WTO membership and average duty are un-
likely to be exogenous. The IV results in Table 2 can thus still be biased. Table
3 reports the results when more regressors are treated as endogenous. Regional in-
dicators are included as they provide better modeling fit and have a large effect on
the estimation results. All estimates of β1 are larger than the estimates without IV
for income. Surprisingly, when more variables are instrumented for, standard errors
decrease rather than increase. Efficiency of the IV estimates appears to improve as a
result of using more instruments for income, GATT membership and the interaction
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terms. For IV with more than 2 endogenous regressors, there are no critical values of
the weak instrument tests. However, Shea partial R2 increases for all specifications.
Most results fit well with our theoretical predictions. The coefficient estimates
on import shares and export shares have expected signs across all specifications.
Moreover, import shares appear to have larger and significant impact on standards
while the impact of export shares is smaller and in general, not significant. In addition,
when equation (1) is estimated for GATT members only, the estimates of import share
coefficient are larger than the full sample estimates. Similarly, the coefficient on
GATT membership (γ2) in column (3) has negative sign. It is thus likely that GATT
member countries are more constrained in tariff settings and are more likely to use
labor standards as an instrument for protection. Import shares and its interaction
with average duty in specification (5) are not significant but it could be a result of low
efficiency due to small sample size. However, the problem with using average duty is
it could be endogenous. Average GATT membership of neighboring countries works
well as an instrument for GATT but it has no explanatory power for average duty. I
have not been able to find an instrument for average duty so the result in column (4)
could be biased.
The estimation results of equation (4) are also problematic for several reasons.
Firstly, the indicator of GATT membership is dropped due to collinearity. As a
result, the effect of GATT membership at levels will be carried out to the affect the
interaction estimates. For example, if this level effect is positive and large then the
effect of the interaction term might appear to be positive even if it is truly negative.
The negative sign of GATT membership in column (3) might lead us to think that
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it is not an issue. However, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between
GATT and import share is positive and significant in column (4). This is the opposite
of what theory predicts as it implies that being a GATT member would reduce the
impact of a country’s import share on labor standard. While its significance seems
to be caused by outlier problems as it becomes insignificant when China – a big non
GATT importer with zero FACB score – is removed, the result is still at odds with
the negative sign of γ2 found in specifications (3). The second problem is the null
hypothesis of underidentified in these two specifications is only rejected at 5% level.
Therefore, one needs to interpret the results in columns (4) with caution because
weak instruments might cause finite sample bias.
Beside our main variables of interest, the coefficient estimates for other variables
are fairly stable across all specifications in Table 3.3. They also have the same signs
as in the OLS estimates.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
Table 3.4 & 3.5 present some of the results when different robustness checks are
performed. The first check is to consider the impact of outliers. It is a dilemma to
decide if countries such as China and USA should belong to the sample. On one
hand, including these unusually large importers could bias estimates. On the other
hand, the purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of market power on labor
standards, which applies exactly to those large countries. To minimize the impacts of
outliers, import and export shares have been used in the natural log form in the main
regressions. However, to examine whether the results were not driven solely because of
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one or two observations in the sample, all the specifications are re-estimated without
USA and/or China. The results show that excluding China does not change the
results significantly but the USA greatly dominates the results. In all specifications,
when the USA is excluded, the coefficient estimates on import shares are smaller and
generally insignificant. Nevertheless, they remain negative while the export share
coefficients stay positive and smaller in absolute value.
As explained earlier, I use both import and export shares in my regression to
account for the fact that using net import could be misleading about the real market
power of a country. However, I also estimate equations (3.1)-(3.3) with net import
shares to see if the prediction is still robust to using a different proxy of market
power. Table 5 presents the results when the average import share of other countries
is used as a simple instrument for a country’s net import. Income is instrumented
using lagged capital per worker and lagged investment share of GDP (hence the
smaller sample size). Note that log of income squared is not included because in
instruments are not strong enough as in the main regressions. The results also confirm
a negative impact of net imports on labor standards, particularly in the sample of
GATT members only. Our theoretical prediction thus holds when different regressors
and different instruments are used. Another interesting finding from Table 5 is that
latitude has extremely small and insignificant effect. In fact, the results are almost
unchanged when it is excluded. This observation suggests that latitude is actually
correlated to our geography-based instruments because when it is excluded from the
main regressions, the results change significantly.
In previous empirical work, it is suggested that legal origin and the political ori-
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entation of the country’s chief executive and congress could affect labor standards.
For example Botero et al. (2004)’s work on the regulation of labor find common law
to have a negative impact while more leftist/centrist governments have a positive im-
pact on labor standards. If these variables are not correlated to geography however,
omitting them does not cause any bias.
As a sensitivity check, I include dummy variables for British, French, German,
Scandinavian and Socialist legal system in all specifications of Table 3.1, 3.2 & 3.3.
The coefficient estimates on import shares change in some cases but are still negative
and significant at the same levels of significance. My results are thus robust to the
presence of legal origin indicators.
I include next a variable calculated as the percentage of the years from 1975-1995
in which the chief executive and the majority party in congress of a country have
leftist or centrist political orientation. The variable has expected positive sign but
is not significant in general. Import shares are still negative but become insignifi-
cant in all but specification (5) of Table 3.3. Moreover, the coefficient estimates are
systematically smaller in absolute values (although a Hausman tests cannot the hy-
pothesis that they are equal). However, when it is included in specifications (1) & (2)
in Table 3.5, the net import variable remains significant and its magnitudes almost
do not change. It is thus likely that political orientation is correlated to countries’
geographical characteristics.
Finally, Neumayer & De Soysa (2006) suggest that the FACB variable could be
systematically underreported for countries with smaller shares of the manufacturing
sector. To control for this issue, I include manufacturing share of GDP in all specifica-
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tions. Including this variable could be a problem because it results in smaller sample
size and 1st stage F statistics. However, the coefficient estimates of import shares
are still significant and similar in magnitude. On the other hand, the manufacturing
share variable is not significant and also not always positive as predicted.
In summary, the study’s results are not robust to all different specifications. Nev-
ertheless, it is encouraging that the coefficient estimates on import shares always
remain negative and larger than the export share coefficients.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, I have attempted to investigate empirically the prediction that coun-
tries use labor standards as a substitute for import tariffs to improve their terms of
trade. More specifically, I use cross country data on FACB rights and trade in labor
intensive goods to test this simple hypothesis: all else equal, a country’s market share
in world import should affect its labor standard negatively. The gravity model is
used to construct geography-based instruments for trade to account for endogene-
ity of trade and income variables. The paper does not aim to quantify the impact
of import market shares on labor standards. Rather, it seeks to separate out the
noises caused by endogeneity to find whether a causal link exists between these two
variables.
The paper finds IV estimates on the import share coefficient to be systematically
higher than OLS estimates. This is an indication that unobserved heterogeneity
might have biased OLS results. Although the estimated impact of import shares is
not consistent and significant across all different specifications, it is always negative as
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theory predicts. It suggests the cross country data offer some evidence that domestic
policies such as labor standard policies could in reality serve as a secondary means of
protection.
One implication of the results is they suggest the need to prevent countries from
using distorting domestic policies that undermine the effectiveness of trade agreement.
However, it is not an argument for harmonization of standards. As Bagwell & Staiger
(2001) argue, demands for harmonization originate from a misunderstanding of the
cause of the race-to-the-bottom. The authors point out that if the terms of trade
incentive is the issue at hand, rebalancing market access would be an efficient solution.
My results also cast doubts about empirical studies on the impact of labor standards
on export performance that treat standards as exogenous. Since exports and imports
are highly correlated, a negative association between export performance and labor
standards does not necessarily mean that higher standards harm exports. OLS results
could be overestimated by the fact that big importing countries deliberately lower
their standards to improve terms of trade. Nonetheless, the results should be treated
with great caution. An important reason is that the dependent variable used is not
a perfect measure of labor standards. Labor standards have many dimensions to it
and theory does not provide any suggestions for which dimension governments would
choose. Therefore, unlike the case of tariffs in which higher tariffs is an unmistakable
sign of protection, it is much harder to conclude that bigger importing countries
choose worse FACB rights as a mean of protection.
The study could be improved in several ways. Firstly, the current country coverage
in the two datasets is small due to the way trade for transition countries is reported
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in Feenstra (2000). Using a bigger and more consistent dataset should benefit the
results. Secondly, although I have considered the impact of GATT membership,
my approach has not captured the fact that GATT/WTO members can still apply
tariffs on non-member countries. The effect of membership might therefore be better
estimated if I consider trade among members only. Finally, cross country studies are
in most cases prone to unobserved heterogeneity problems, which call for the need
of panel estimations. Structural estimations with industry-level data can also help
substantiate evidence found in cross country data.
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Tab. 3.1: The impact of import shares on FACB rights OLS results
Dependent variable FACB rights weighted index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(import share) -0.509 -0.492 -0.18 -0.848 -0.699
[0.253]** [0.261]* [0.409] [0.231]*** [0.282]**
ln(export share) -0.072 -0.084 -0.255 0.081 0.075
[0.136] [0.139] [0.179] [0.151] [0.148]
ln(income) -9.286 -9.282 -10.169 -11.658 -8.853
[3.187]*** [3.189]*** [3.557]*** [4.269]*** [5.465]
(ln(income))2 0.606 0.605 0.659 0.757 0.596
[0.196]*** [0.196]*** [0.219]*** [0.249]*** [0.317]*
Polity 0.184 0.182 0.184 0.157 0.161
[0.056]*** [0.057]*** [0.058]*** [0.051]*** [0.051]***
Latitude 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.023 0.023
[0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]** [0.009]**










Constant 35.333 35.278 40.411 43.029 31.841
[12.723]*** [12.728]*** [15.011]*** [18.265]** [22.860]
Observations 96 96 96 74 74
R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.54 0.55
Heteroskedasticity-robust OLS. Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Tab. 3.2: IV results treating import and export shares as endogenous
Dependent variable FACB rights weighted index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(import share) -0.536 -0.578 3.933 -0.683 -0.719
[0.615] [0.719] [3.005] [0.581] [0.515]
ln(export share) -0.197 -0.168 -2.748 -0.103 -0.023
[0.402] [0.472] [1.630]* [0.376] [0.306]
ln(income) -8.576 -8.759 -14.308 -10.831 -9.396
[3.372]** [3.461]** [5.645]** [3.785]*** [4.797]*
(ln(income))2 0.572 0.583 0.892 0.706 0.627
[0.206]*** [0.214]*** [0.331]*** [0.226]*** [0.283]**
Polity 0.193 0.191 0.173 0.164 0.165
[0.040]*** [0.042]*** [0.060]*** [0.041]*** [0.040]***
Latitude 0.027 0.027 0.03 0.024 0.024
[0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.014]** [0.010]** [0.009]**











First stage Shea partial R2
ln(import share) 0.18 0.147 0.075 0.248 0.375
ln(export share) 0.165 0.135 0.071 0.242 0.348
Min eigenvalue stat 3.964 3.119 1.349 4.674 7.802
Constant 31.193 31.503 77.987 40.43 33.876
[12.727]** [12.814]** [35.898]** [15.323]*** [19.102]*
Observations 96 96 96 74 74
FIML estimations. Standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
The minimum eigenvalue statistic is the statistic for Stock & Yogo (2004) weak instrument test.
H0: instruments are weak. For IV LIML with 2 endogenous regressors and 4 excluded instruments,
the critical values at 5% level of significance for 15% and 10% bias are 3.39 and 4.72 respectively.
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Tab. 3.3: IV results treating trade shares, income & GATT membership as endogenous
Dependent variable FACB rights weighted index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(import share) -0.826 -1.494 -1.184 -2.006 -0.706
[0.483]* [0.791]* [0.555]** [0.638]*** [0.494]
ln(export share) 0.261 0.758 0.491 0.742 0.072
[0.335] [0.571] [0.357] [0.341]** [0.312]
ln(income) -19.441 -20.2 -22.053 -22.35 -16.218
[7.134]*** [6.710]*** [7.284]*** [6.854]*** [6.364]**
(ln(income))2 1.178 1.247 1.348 1.385 1.021
[0.413]*** [0.395]*** [0.419]*** [0.402]*** [0.380]***
Polity 0.264 0.266 0.281 0.266 0.175
[0.072]*** [0.070]*** [0.074]*** [0.067]*** [0.058]***
Latitude 0.013 0.018 0.014 0.02 0.002
[0.014] [0.018] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015]







Average import duties -0.039
[0.033]
Constant 78.745 76.358 88.326 83.826 64.133
[30.896]** [28.230]*** [31.540]*** [27.498]*** [25.578]**
First stage Shea partial R2
ln(import share) 0.313 0.131 0.257 0.263 0.31
ln(export share) 0.268 0.104 0.218 0.51 0.285
ln(income) 0.331 0.331 0.304 0.304 0.586




Observations 91 84 91 91 71
R-squared 0.41 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.59
IV GMM estimations with small sample adjustments. Standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%;
**at 5%; *** at 1%. Column (2): results from the sample with GATT members only
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Tab. 3.4: Sensitivity analysis 1
Excluding China or the USA GATT
excl. USA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(import share) -1.275 -2.024 -0.567 -1.026 -0.735
[0.574]** [0.693]*** [0.502] [0.845] [0.886]
ln(export share) 0.572 0.572 0.049 0.11 0.193
[0.427] [0.416] [0.361] [0.513] [0.687]
ln(income) -22.692 -21.365 -21.673 -21.373 -20.32
[7.402]*** [7.032]*** [7.610]*** [7.325]*** [7.143]***
(ln(income))2 1.383 1.345 1.322 1.334 1.244
[0.425]*** [0.412]*** [0.442]*** [0.430]*** [0.422]***
Polity 0.284 0.265 0.236 0.232 0.236
[0.074]*** [0.067]*** [0.073]*** [0.075]*** [0.077]***
Latitude 0.014 0.024 0.012 0.019 0.012
[0.015] [0.018] [0.015] [0.018] [0.018]
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
GATT dummy -2.401
[1.813]
ln(import shares)*GATT 0.289 0.052
[0.406] [0.473]
ln(export shares)*GATT 0.333 0.246
[0.629] [0.690]
Constant 90.98 76.94 87.985 81.829 81.613
[32.327]*** [29.478]** [32.680]*** [30.018]*** [29.212]***
F statistics on 1st stage equations
ln(import share) equation 66.33 65.43 63.57 55.38 59.75
ln(export share) equation 49.91 49.49 37.65 38.45 32.7
ln(income) 31.75 55.26 25.06 55.15 36.18
(ln(income))2 33.15 53.58 26.15 53.17 36.2
GATT 53.9
ln(import share)*GATT 238.46 225.46
ln(export share)*GATT 43.78 32.47
Observations 90 90 90 89 83
R-squared 0.34 0.32 0.41 0.4 0.4
IV GMM & 2SLS heteroskedasticity-robust estimation. Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Column (1) & (2): China is excluded. Column (3): the USA is
excluded. Column (4): China and the USA are excluded. Column (5): GATT members excluding the USA.
When the USA is excluded, 2SLS is used instead of GMM due to the singleton dummy problem
(regional dummy for North America)
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Tab. 3.5: Sensitivity analysis 2
IV for net import share
(1) (2) (3)
Net import share -0.552 -0.533 -0.428
[0.290]* [0.267]* [0.175]**
ln(income) 0.587 0.59 0.42
[0.581] [0.588] [0.586]
Polity 0.231 0.229 0.19
[0.066]*** [0.066]*** [0.068]***
Latitude -0.0002 0.00005 0.01
[0.019] [0.019] [0.020]
ln(net import share)*GATT -0.014
[0.151]
Constant 0.678 0.586 2.218
[5.868] [6.111] [5.986]
F statistics on 1st stage equations
Net import share 7.68 6.27 17.54
ln(income) 34.06 32.34 52.72
ln(net import share)*GATT 84.8
Observations 88 88 81
R-squared 0.37 0.4 0.4
IV GMM with small sample adjustments. Robust standard errors in brackets,
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.




A Empirical model with an endogenous productivity process
This sections sets up a simple model of the firm’s profit maximizing problem to illustrate
endogeneity issues with foreign employment and explains an estimating procedure based on
ACF (2006) using materials to proxy for productivity to correct for this problem. We omit
the issue of attrition bias for simplicity, but it can be reintroduced with an additional step
that predicts exits using past investment (at the expense of being more data intensive).




Let eτit be a time-varying parameter that reflects an output distortion faced by the firm
so that the firm’s realized output is only eτityit where τit < 0.
1 Under our hypothesis that
this distortion is increasing over time during the conflict for firms employing foreigners,
denoting some measure of foreign employment as ρit, we can write τit as a time indexed
function: τit = ht(ρit).
We maintain the assumptions that (i) the “real” productivity index Ait follows a first
order Markov process so that Ait = E(Ait|Ait−1) + ξit, and (ii) the timing of investment is
such that it takes one full period to form working capital so current level of capital stock
is uncorrelated to the current productivity shocks. Allowing for input prices to change
with whether firms employ foreigners and normalizing output price, the firm’s profit in any
period t can be written as: 2
π(kit, lit,mit, ρit, Ait) = e
ωitf(kit, lit,mit)− c(kit, lit,mit, ρit)
where ωit = Ait + ht(ρit)
It can be shown that under general assumptions, the material input demand is a functions
of the state variables Ait and kit and it is strictly increasing in the productivity parameter.
We follow ACF (2006) to assume that labor decisions are made after the productivity shocks
are completely realized but before decisions on purchasing materials so that the firm solves
1 As discussed in the Methodology section, this distortion could arise if some firms (i) had their
output expropriated, stolen, taxed more heavily or (ii) were forced to close operations more often.
2 In the empirical estimation, we only have value and not quantity data thus the distinction is
irrelevant. Consequently, the differences in estimated productivity can also reflect how firms’ product
demand over time were affected differently
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a sequential problem and chooses labor composition first.3 Then:
mit = mt(kit, Ait, lit, ρit)
Because of strict monotonicity, we can invert the material input demand function to get
Ait = m
−1
t (kit,mit, lit, ρit) (A-1)
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas functional form, we can rewrite the (log) value added production
function as:
yit = β0 + βkkit + βllit +Ait + ht(ρit) + εit (A-2)
= β0 + φt(kit,mit, lit, ρit) + εit (A-3)
In our implementation, we approximate for φt semi-parametrically by a third order poly-
nomial. There is a time index t in mt and φt because of our hypothesis that the impact
of being a foreign firm changes overtime with conflict intensity. Accordingly, the empirical
estimation of the above equation has to allow for this possibility. Due to data constraints,
we allow φt to change only once by including a dummy variable indicating the start of the
conflict and its interactions with all other terms in the function φt. It is consistent with
assuming that ht(ρit) = h
1(ρit) before the conflict and ht(ρit) = h
2(ρit) during the conflict.
The first step in the estimation involves estimating equation (A-3) to get predicted values
for φt. If we have some initial values for βk, βl and ht(ρit) then we can get a predicted value
of the productivity term:
Ãit = φ̂t − β∗kkit − β∗l lit − h∗t (ρit)
Based on the assumption of the productivity process, we can get an estimate of the
unexpected shocks ξit in the productivity process by regressing Ãit on a function of Ãit−1:
ξ̂it = φ̂t − β∗kkit − β∗l lit − h∗t (ρit)− g(φ̂t−1 − β∗kkit−1 − β∗l lit−1 − h∗t−1(ρit−1))
We approximate for g by a second order polynomial and use the following moment
conditions to estimate βk, βl and the parameters in ht(ρit):
E(ξit|kit, lit−1, ρit−1,mit−1, kit−1) = 0 (A-4)
From equations (A-3) and (A-4), it can be seen that if ρit is not included in the proxy
function φt, the estimated ξ̂it would still contain information on ρit. Therefore if the choices
of foreign employees are correlated with labor or capital then we will get biased estimates
using these moment conditions.
If ht(ρit) contains a large number of parameters, it would require more moment conditions
for identification and a large sample size to get precise estimates. Given our data constraints,
3 What this means is labor does not have to be a perfectly variable input as needed in the OP
estimation procedure. Thus we can accommodate the case where labor and its composition (in
terms of foreign/domestic workers) are serially correlated. Moreover, this estimation procedure is
consistent with firm-specific capital and labor price shocks since they will simply be reflected in the
material input demand function. This is an important advantage since in the context of a developing
country like Cote d’Ivoire, it is likely that there are frictions in the labor and capital markets which
result in different input prices across firms.
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we assume that
ht(ρit) = γ0ρit + γ1ρit × after + γ2after + ηit
where after is a dummy indicating the conflict period and ηit is a random noise unknown
to the firm.
B Data appendix
B.1 Construction of variables used in TFP estimation
For the production function estimation, we need measures of output, inputs and in-
vestment. Except for labor input, all other variables are taken from the balance sheet
information and measured in monetary values.
Labor: is measured as the total number of permanent employees. The employment
information from the data allows us to distinguish between technical and unskilled employees
and thus the ability to estimate separate coefficients on skilled and unskilled labor in the
production function.
Capital and investment: Capital is proxied for by total fixed assets in book values in
US dollars and investment is total acquisition of tangible and intangible fixed assets. With
this definition, there are 10719 firm-year observations, or 70% of the sample, reporting
positive investment. Both capital stock and investment are observed every year in the
data. Therefore, we can also calculate investment or capital using the perpetually inventory
method: Iit = Kit+1− (1−δ)Kit where δ is the depreciation rate. De Loecker (2007) argues
that this method is preferred when reported investment is not accurate. However, the
lack of data on depreciation rates at the industry level makes this method also prone to
measurement errors. Moreover, using a 15% depreciation rate for all firms, the number
of firm-year observations with positive investment account for less than one third of the
sample. Therefore the reported investment will be used in the estimation.
Output: we estimate the production function using the reported value added as a measure
of output (implicitly imposing a separability assumption in the production functions).
Materials: are defined as total cost of intermediate inputs and other good purchases.
Since both value added and materials are reported in the data, we reestimate value added
- gross output less intermediate inputs and other purchases - as a robustness check as
inaccuracies (in terms of reporting errors) are common. The two measures are highly
correlated thus only results using reported value-added are included in the paper.
Industry classification and industry-specific deflators: Due to a revision in the industry
classification in 1998, many firms in the data in 1998 and 1999 have missing sector infor-
mation. To fill in this information, one can use sector information available in later years.
This procedure implies a bias that firms that exited before 1999 are less likely to have sector
information. To deal with this problem, we augmented the data with sector information
from earlier years4. Because of inconsistent sector categorization, we reconcile the sector
variable by using a harmonized classification that groups some industries from the old and
new systems. Consequently, some industry deflators need to be recalculated. We calculate
4 We have identification and employment data for firms prior to 1998, but financial information
was not available. This procedure still implies that firms that entered and exited in 1998 are more
likely to have missing sector information. However, the TFP estimation is not affected by this
because we need at least 2 periods of data for each firm
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the new deflators by adding the monetary values (production, value-added or intermediate
goods) of the newly formed industries both in real and nominal terms and take the ratios
of these two terms.
B.2 Constructing ownership variables
Recall that we define ownership by the nationality of the firm’s largest shareholder.
Since for more than 95% of the sample, the largest total share of shareholders of the same
nationality is also larger than 50%, this definition almost coincides with ownership definition
often found elsewhere in the corporate finance literature. Because the data were entered
manually, there are significant number of typos which resulted in duplicate entries and
inflated values (in cases when decimal places were entered wrongly). We fix the typos when
possible using the rule that individual shares have to sum up to approximately 100 (i.e.
dropping the duplicated entries and divide the values by an appropriate number) and drop
the firms when there are no obvious way to fix the values. Another caveat with using this
information is that data are not available in 1998 and are missing for a large number of
firms in later years.
B.3 Conflict data
We use the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED, Raleigh 2010)5 to con-
struct the conflict rate variables. This database tracks politically driven events in unstable
and warring states therefore does not include crime violence. The database was compiled
from various sources including news articles, books and humanitarian workers accounts of
conflict events with the exact date, and by longitude and attitude. The longitude and
latitude information allows us to merge the conflict data with GIS data on Cote d’Ivoire
administrative boundaries to locate any conflict in the respective administrative unit.
5 Available at http://www.acleddata.com/
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Tab. 1.B.1: Industries and industry groupings
Industry Group Description Median Proportion of firms with foreign Number of firms by
ln(K/L) Ownership Employment Industry Group
2 1 Agriculture for industry and
export
0.71 0.55 0.91 224 338
3 Forestry and logging 1.47 0.55 0.91 58
4 Fishery products 1.13 0.42 0.77 56
6 2 Grain and flour products 0.95 0.35 0.56 235 272
9 Oilseed industry 1.71 0.10 0.84 37
7 3 Canned and food preparations 1.79 0.59 0.77 53 169
8 Beverages andice cream 2.58 0.47 0.89 27
10 Other food products 2.13 0.55 0.66 89
11 4 Textiles 2.14 0.53 0.84 103 177
12 Leather andfootwear 1.36 0.85 0.70 74
13 5 Wood industries 1.36 0.74 0.84 411 411
15 6 Chemicals 1.83 0.67 0.77 190 476
16 Rubber Products 2.25 0.70 0.85 225
17 Building materials, glass 1.75 0.81 0.84 61
19 7 Transport equipment 0.28 0.71 0.72 186 186
20 8 Mechanical and electrical-
products
1.37 0.61 0.69 388 388
21 9 Other manufacturing 1.22 0.48 0.68 394 394
23 10 Construction and Mainte-
nance
0.56 0.52 0.56 884 884
24 11 Transport and communica-
tions
1.58 0.49 0.64 808 808
25 12 Rental and management of
buildings
2.10 0.61 0.66 261 261
26 13 Other services 1.00 0.48 0.49 1961 1961
27 14 Commerce 0.91 0.54 0.47 4919 4919
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Tab. 1.B.2: Production function coefficient estimates
OP ACF
Ind. group capital skilled L unskilled L capital skilled L unskilled L
1 0.339** 0.277*** 0.228*** 0.195** 0.336*** 0.255***
2 0.345** 0.292*** 0.245*** 0.218** 0.319*** 0.291***
3 0.331 0.550*** -0.0242 0.314 0.0168 -0.159
4 0.435** 0.350*** 0.238*** 0.292 0.297* 0.354**
5 -0.159 0.318*** 0.336*** 0.128 0.276*** 0.268**
6 0.306* 0.398*** 0.188*** 0.328* 0.468*** 0.205***
7 0.280*** 0.482*** 0.430*** 0.258*** 0.418*** 0.399***
8 0.295*** 0.670*** 0.275*** 0.206* 0.607*** 0.205***
9 0.260 0.469*** 0.273*** 0.253** 0.277** 0.229*
10 0.279*** 0.401*** 0.268*** 0.296*** 0.442*** 0.253***
11 0.319*** 0.369*** 0.216*** 0.285*** 0.116 0.128*
12 0.176 0.523*** 0.348*** 0.216** 0.732*** 0.326***
13 0.279*** 0.535*** 0.240*** 0.303*** 0.556*** 0.226***
14 0.144*** 0.498*** 0.301*** 0.174*** 0.505*** 0.248***
Clustered bootstrap standard errors *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tab. 1.B.3: Correlation coefficients of productivity estimates
Labor pro-
ductivity
OP TFP ACF TFP
Labor productivity 1
OP TFP 0.9515* 1
ACF TFP 0.8341* 0.8064* 1




All data are averaged over 1993-1997 unless otherwise indicated
FACB indexes: Kucera (2004)
Import shares: Sum of bilateral imports for each country by trading partners over BEA
categories 5, 6 & 34 and corresponding SITC rv.2 categories of manufacturing goods, divided
by world imports in the same categories. Source: Feenstra (2000) and Feenstra et al. (2005)
Export shares: Sum of bilateral exports for each country by trading partners over BEA
categories 5, 6 & 34 and corresponding SITC rv.2 categories of manufacturing goods, divided
by world imports in the same categories. Source: Feenstra (2000) and Feenstra et al. (2005)
Trade openness: (Import + Export)/GDP. Source: Rose (2004)
Income: real GDP per capita, Laspeyres index. Source: Penn World Table 6.2
Capital per worker: capital per worker in 1987. Source: Easterly (2001)
Lagged investment share of real GDP: average investment share of real GDP in 1988-
1992. Source: Penn World Table 6.2
Manufacturing shares of GDP: WDI 2006
Latitude: Easterly (2001) and CIA World Factbook
Regional and legal system dummies: Easterly (2001)
GATT/WTO accession year: Rose (2004)
Average import duties: WDI 2006
Geographical variables in the gravity model: bilateral distance, landlocked status, indi-
cators for common borders, common language, population and area from Rose (2004) with
minor correction for landlocked status from CIA World Factbook
Polity: democracy score with 10 denotes complete democracy and -10 denotes complete
autocracy. Source: Polity IV project
Political orientation: the percentage of years from 1975-1997 that both a country’s chief
executive and congress have leftist or centrist political orientation. Source: World Bank
(2002)
B Main variables by country
Tab. 3.B.1: FACB rights, log of import shares and export shares
Country FACB index, weighted ln(import share) ln(export share)
Burkina Faso 8.5 -10.4363 -6.85817
Continued on next page
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Guyana 8.65 -10.3189 -5.98627
Sierra Leone 7.59 -10.3059 -3.9293
Malawi 5.04 -9.91508 -6.52246
Ethiopia 2.33 -9.65952 -5.56763
Uganda 6.09 -9.54604 -9.83084
Zambia 2.48 -9.42275 -4.80014
Niger 6.99 -9.28533 -8.84714
Nepal 6.39 -9.09526 -2.52597
Nicaragua 6.09 -9.04672 -4.94253
Senegal 5.94 -8.97973 -6.49674
Guinea 6.99 -8.91365 -3.84405
Cameroon 3.08 -8.88171 -6.18412
Trinidad and Tobago 9.55 -8.84813 -5.57048
Yemen, Rep. 5.04 -8.73544 -11.0235
Haiti 6.24 -8.71713 -3.88105
Cambodia 5.94 -8.65763 -3.72211
Gambia, The 8.2 -8.63347 -4.02159
Tanzania 6.69 -8.55177 -4.59167
Cote d’Ivoire 5.34 -8.54332 -3.4185
Madagascar 8.35 -8.49322 -4.71916
Ghana 7.89 -8.30694 -3.26277
Fiji 5.19 -8.27619 -3.71571
Zimbabwe 4.44 -8.20688 -3.36344
Qatar 0 -8.19287 -4.30758
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2.93 -8.17086 -2.18648
Kenya 4.44 -8.12745 -4.36145
Myanmar 0 -8.06712 -3.29406
Togo 5.49 -8.0504 -6.06289
Bolivia 1.43 -8.04639 -3.79815
Iceland 9.1 -8.01655 -5.32802
Benin 8.2 -7.99274 -7.75148
Jordan 6.69 -7.93398 -5.1221
Bahrain 7.14 -7.84758 -3.94552
Pakistan 2.78 -7.74636 0.235094
Nigeria 2.03 -7.66908 -3.73814
Oman 7.89 -7.61193 -3.88787
Syrian Arab Republic 0 -7.52933 -3.43153
Peru 2.03 -7.42222 -2.30999
Uruguay 8.65 -7.33667 -2.06223
El Salvador 2.78 -7.33574 -3.63977
Cyprus 8.65 -7.18904 -3.26931
Guatemala 2.48 -7.16785 -3.9333
Jamaica 8.5 -6.92371 -2.69305
Honduras 3.08 -6.90578 -5.31506
Slovak Republic 8.2 -6.89516 -1.83001
Continued on next page
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Mauritius 6.39 -6.82163 -1.66409
Costa Rica 2.56 -6.78281 -2.81705
Venezuela 6.92 -6.72368 -3.82183
Egypt, Arab Rep. 4.59 -6.509 -1.76039
Sri Lanka 6.09 -6.45551 -0.91852
Bangladesh 1.73 -6.43112 -0.64388
Slovenia 8.05 -6.41742 -1.56819
Kuwait 3.53 -6.35786 -4.65665
New Zealand 9.1 -6.32491 -2.2891
Morocco 3.68 -6.09125 -1.26668
Dominican Republic 4.29 -5.93031 -1.1087
Chile 5.86 -5.89334 -3.08479
Argentina 2.56 -5.88916 -1.23684
Philippines 1.95 -5.80551 -0.82027
South Africa 5.49 -5.78599 -1.07915
Panama 5.19 -5.758 -4.88085
Romania 4.29 -5.74612 -0.77385
Czech Republic 7.29 -5.68626 -0.97703
Indonesia 0.98 -5.63746 0.636776
Hungary 6.84 -5.59152 -0.77992
Finland 9.55 -5.56723 -1.90217
Tunisia 6.54 -5.5542 -0.55362
Brazil 3.83 -5.41491 -0.26886
Ireland 10 -5.2632 -0.91601
Norway 8.65 -5.16862 -2.50782
Malaysia 2.18 -5.15152 -0.3505
Greece 9.1 -5.14219 -0.49933
Thailand 5.04 -4.99264 0.585193
Poland 8.2 -4.95522 -0.16127
India 5.34 -4.90649 0.936832
Denmark 8.2 -4.82393 -0.52395
Portugal 10 -4.79274 0.462574
Sweden 9.55 -4.64942 -1.10462
Australia 7.44 -4.61334 -1.17086
Mexico 2.63 -4.48318 0.143281
Korea, Rep. 2.93 -4.46174 1.28028
Israel 6.69 -4.43892 0.308848
Austria 10 -4.34253 0.1374
Singapore 8.2 -4.31986 -0.20714
Spain 8.05 -4.16351 0.272603
Canada 8.65 -3.94635 -0.33924
Switzerland 9.55 -3.7672 0.567749
Netherlands 9.55 -3.61606 0.799526
Italy 9.55 -3.40865 2.279344
China 0 -3.11063 2.392195
Continued on next page
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France 8.95 -2.97081 1.338422
United Kingdom 4.14 -2.89247 1.338834
Japan 6.39 -2.66267 0.974143
Germany 9.47 -2.27114 1.583193
United States 4.74 -1.66689 1.615339
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